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   In his book, The Open (2004), Giorgio Agamben suggests that the border 
between the human and the animal passes “first of all as a mobile border within 
living man”. At stake in the construction of this border is a division of the human 
and the animal into separate and homogenous groups, and subsequently a denial 
of a multiplicity of life forms and experience. This relates to what Derrida (2004) 
has deemed “the self-interested misrecognition of what is called the Animal in 
general”, and is something other critics working in the field of animal studies have 
discussed. 
   In this thesis I read Milan Kundera’s novel The Unbearable Lightness of Being and 
J.M. Coetzee’s Disgrace in line with Agamben’s notion of the fluidity of the 
human-animal border. The first chapter of this dissertation, “Behaving like 
Animals”, offers a reading of the biblical tale of Genesis and of the numerous 
sexual encounters in the novels that complicate the assumption of shame as being 
“proper to man”. The second chapter, “Alternative lives, Alternative Deaths”, 
challenges the idea of Driepoot’s death in Disgrace as being ‘euthanasia’ and, 
moreover, examines the complexities of mourning the death of what Jeff 
McMahan has deemed “beings on the margins of life”, which includes both 
humans and animals. 
   In my analysis of these novels, I have borrowed from different, seemingly 
disconnected, critical discourses. In some cases, this has meant ‘inserting’ the 
animal into these theories in places where the animal was not explicitly named. 















approach to theorising animals, and our relations to and with them, suggests 






















Etymology: <Anglo-Norman and Middle French animal (French 
animal) living creature, beast (excluding man) (12th cent. in Old 
French), living creature (excluding plants) (13th cent.), stupid or 
uncouth person (1537) and its etymon classical Latin animal living 
creature (including man), living organism (including plants), animal 
other than man, (applied contemptuously to a person) creature, 
brute, in post-classical Latin also animal nature in man (6th cent.)  
animal, adj.   
Of a human being, or a human attribute, faculty, etc.: having or 
sharing some of the features or functions of an animal; 
characteristic of or like (that of) an animal; physical or instinctive, 
rather than intellectual, moral, or spiritual. Cf. animal spirit n. 
Sometimes with neutral or positive sense: ‘physical, natural, innate’; 
but more often having negative connotations: ‘animal-like, bestial, 
carnal’. 
- OED ‘animal’ 
 
[…] I move from “the ends of man,” that is the confines of man, 
to “the crossing of borders” between man and animal. Passing 
across borders or to the ends of man I come to surrender to the 
animal, to the animal in itself, to the animal in me and the animal 
at unease with itself… 
- The Animal that Therefore I am, 3. 
 
   The dictionary definition of ‘animal’ contains more than sixty possible meanings, 
including composite words and metaphoric uses of the word. Sometimes the 
‘animal’ is explained via a separation from the ‘human’, at other times the ‘animal’ 
is used to explain ‘human’ attributes or those that distinguish one ‘human’ from 
other ‘humans’. These combinations are at once dependent on each other for 
meaning, and at the same time used to differentiate one from the other. Crucially, 
although the term ‘animal’ has changed over time, its use to describe a ‘human’ 
has overwhelmingly carried negative connotations. But since both ‘animal’ and 
‘human’ need each other for co-definition, it is odd that the term ‘animal’ should 
denote negative aspects of the ‘human’ (but not the other way around). These 
disparities and problems come to the fore in the two novels in this thesis: Milan 















(1999). Here, I will explore some of the ways in which these two texts interpret 
the nebulous border between the ‘human’ and the ‘animal’. For the sake of 
legibility I will no longer use inverted commas when speaking about these two 
groups. The reader can assume they are present in my thoughts, as the meaning of 
the term is not static but depends on, among other things, the cultural 
environment in which it is used. The novels are set in different time periods, and 
help depict this point.  
 
***** 
   
   There are, however, numerous points of convergence in the work of these two 
writers. Although both have received critical attention (Coetzee more than 
Kundera), no one has yet begun a conversation about the main dog characters in 
each novel: Karenin and Driepoot. More specifically, although Driepoot and the 
death of animals in Disgrace has sparked many areas of debate (a look at the 
contents page of numerous books can confirm this), Karenin and his death have 
been ignored, moaned at for disrupting the classical notion of "novelistic 
development”, deemed as being “seemingly unrelated to the actions and situations” 
of the other characters,1 or even relegated to the sphere of “motif” in the novel.2 
The separate chapters of this dissertation bring to the fore, if not directly the 
animal characters in the novels, then at least the questions that they bring up in 
relation to the human characters therein.       
   As the dictionary definition of ‘animal’ depicts, the ideas that permeate the 
animal are closely aligned to the concept of the human. In a similar vein, 
Agamben notes that the various divisions that separate life “into vegetable and 
relational, organic and animal, animal and human” pass “first of all as a mobile 
border within living man” and fundamentally, “without this intimate caesura the 
very decision of what is human and what is not would probably not be possible”.3 
What is striking about these lines are the fluid (thus changeable and constantly 
redefined) nature of what it means to be human and the crucial role of the animal 
in a human self-definition. That is, the latter is used as a measuring stick by which 















human and the non-human are defined. This is problematic because it entails a set 
of criteria that appear to fit neatly into the concept of the human and are thus said 
to be lacking in the animal. It also creates a normative model of the human that is 
pernicious to those that do not fit the mould. This is precisely what critics 
working in the field of animal studies have argued against. 
    In a 2004 interview with Elizabeth Roudinesco titled “Violence against 
Animals”, Jacques Derrida reflects on the ontological, scientific and physical 
violence committed against animals, even through the apparent separation that is 
signaled and created by oppositional terms such as human and animal: 
I am suspicious of the appellation “Animal” in the singular, as if 
there were simply Man and the Animal, as if the homogenous 
concept THE Animal could be extended universally to all 
nonhuman forms of living beings […] Wherever something like 
“the animal” is named, the gravest, most resistant, also the most 
naïve and the most self-interested presuppositions dominate what is 
called human culture (and not only Western culture); in any case 
they dominate the philosophical discourse that has been prevalent 
for centuries.4  
 
   The dominant assumption that Derrida hints at can be traced back in various 
ways. The ecofeminist Carol Adams (1990), for instance, interprets the Garden of 
Eden as a vegetarian paradise, 5  and Derrida in other ways challenges an 
interpretation of the human protagonists in the tale of Genesis as sole proprietors 
of the animals. Moreover, the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben goes back 
even further to examine the Aristotelian notion of zoe and bios in numerous of his 
writings.6 The distinction in these concepts is the one beween political life and 
bodily life. The animal is relegated to a state of bodily life, which is more 
vulnerable to physical harm. Among others, the work of these writers informs 
many of my own thoughts in this thesis. What these different thinkers have in 
common is a type of thinking that displaces a purely human account of events and 
also of human agency. This human agency is constructed on the basis of the 















animal has been relegated to the realm of instinct. Like other dualisms that have 
been challenged in the critical discourses of, for instance, gender theory, queer and 
race studies, the animal is a construct. But what does one mean when one says 
that the animal is a construct? One of the implications of viewing the animal in 
this way is that it affects a view of the human as a heterogeneous group, as well. 
In other words, any question on the animal has repercussions on the supposed 
meaning of the human. This is because the two concepts, though intended to be 
distinct, are ultimately dependant on each other for meaning and affirmation. 
   Few modern texts exemplify this duality as clearly (or have been as thoroughly 
commented)7 as René Descartes’ Discourse on Method (1637). In Part V of this text 
Descartes makes the notorious comparison of animals to “automata, or moving 
machines”.8 In this way they are said to be able to react, but are denied the ability 
to suffer. Additionally, Descartes claims that animals lack language and “this 
proves not only that the brutes have less reason than man, but that they have 
none at all”.9 Thus, alongside a denial of language, animals are denied the ability to 
think. Finally, animals are denied consciousness and with that, an eternal soul 
(which, in opposition, humans supposedly possess). Descartes’ conception of 
animal souls, however, betrays a sense of ambiguity:  he allows animals to possess 
one, but declares that “feeble minds” must not suppose “that the soul of the 
brutes is of the same nature with our own”.10  
   The problem of the soul casts its shadow in both The Unbearable Lightness of Being 
and in Disgrace. In Kundera’s novel, the problem forms the basis (and the title) of 
two of its sections, and we are reminded by the ever-present narrator that Tereza’s 
constant gazing into the mirror is but “a longing to be a body unlike other 
bodies”.11 What is at stake in the denial of the soul is the horror of being only a 
body like all others, “one like the next, with souls invisible”.12 In the chapters that 
follow, I argue that, for various reasons, Tereza’s point of view becomes 
fundamental to our understanding of the animal experience in Kundera’s novel. 
Importantly, in Disgrace the problem of the soul gains resonance, not with 
reference to a human character, but to the abandoned or ill animals at the Animal 















even after their deaths, signals the possibility that there is more to animal 
existence than purely a bodily life.13   
 
***** 
    
   For Derrida, “when it comes to the relation to “the animal””, the Cartesian 
divide between the body and soul, which has come to represent the divide 
between the human and the animal, “determines all of modernity”.14 Essentially, 
this divide “assumes, for animal language, a system of signs without response: 
reactions but no response […] with everything that depends on this distinction, which 
is always limitless”.15 Derrida sees the border between the human and the animals 
as fluid and porous. For this same reason, however, the scope of separation can 
become “limitless”, that is, expandable with every new disntinction.  
   In line with this, Matthew Calarco (2008) similarly states, “the aim of trying to 
specify what constitutes being human is, at bottom, an ontologically bankrupt and 
politically pernicious project”.16 This ontological bankruptcy, however, is one that 
continues to separate and to be paid for in animal lives and in animal 
representations of beings considered less-than-human. The two novels I will 
explore are immersed in complex and at times problematic images and 
representations of this. The insult Lurie screams at Pollux when he catches him 
spying on Lucy in the shower, “You swine! […] You filthy swine!”17 sheds light on this 
aspect. Of importance here is the role of (violent and negative) language in the 
construction of the animal.   
   Accordingly, Matthew Calarco observes that in the western philosophical 
tradition, “the putative break with animal instinct comes […] with the acquisition 
of language”.18 “It is because animals lack language”, he goes on to state, “that 
they are unable to break with their environmental and instinctual milieu… ”.19 
This is, of course, a point that many critics working in the field of animal studies 
have stated, and argued against. In Kundera’s novel, the notion of human 
language as depicting a form of human rationality or transcendence is comically 
thrown into disarray. Sabina and Franz’ affair, for instance, is marked by linguistic 















(unsuccessfully) in the “Dictionary of Misunderstood Words” in part three of the 
novel.20   
  For philosophers in the Continental tradition, therefore, the “question of the 
animal”21 is not an isolated one. It hinges on innumerable other issues that affect 
more than just animals. For Derrida, its importance lies in that  
 it also represents the limit upon which all the great questions are 
formed and determined, as well as all the concepts that attempt to 
delimit what is “proper to man” , the essence and future of 
humanity, ethics, politics, law, “human rights,” “crimes against 
humanity,” “genocide” etc.”.22   
 
   Agamben similarly notes that “it is more urgent to work on these divisions […] 
than it is to take positions on the great issues, on so-called human rights and 
values”.23 This is because, for Agamben, the border between the human and the 
animal passes first through the human. Thus, this division is conceived as the 
most elemental, the one all others stem from. In line with this, he goes on to state, 
“perhaps even the most luminous sphere of our relations with the divine depends, 
in some way, on that darker one which separates us from the animal”.24   
   In his essay The Animal that therefore I am (2008) Derrida returns to the question 
of the animal. The original French title of his essay, L’Animal que donc Je Suis, 
mirrors Descartes' original dictum "Je pense donc je suis" from his Discourse on 
Method (1637), also originally in French. 25  That Derrida’s own arguments 
concerning animals are so vehemently against Descartes’ is doubly reflected in the 
skewed title of his essay. Here, he takes to task not only Descartes for his 
mechanization of animals and the careless attitude to their suffering, but also 
other philosophers such as Aristotle, Kant, Heidegger, Lacan and Lévinas for 
their own disavowal of the complexity of animal life.26 Part of the complexities 
that they deny the animal are reason, the ability to mourn, to feel pain, to be able 
to laugh, and an awareness of death.27 Derrida traces these prejudices directed at 
the animal via a reading of the biblical myth of Genesis. Here, he critiques the 















Derrida examines the stakes in this “scene of name calling”29 and asks a set of 
fundamental questions: 
Who was born first, before the names? Which one saw the other 
come to this place, so long ago? Who will have been the first 
occupant, and therefore the master? Who the subject? Who has 
remained the despot, for so long now?30 
   
   Crucially, in Kundera’s The Unbearable Lightness of Being, Karenin has a sense of 
intentionality, considers Mefisto the pig his friend, is said to smile, and feel 
sadness. Towards the end of the novel, moreover, we may read his desire to act 
better than he as depicting a level of pity towards his human companions (who 
are suffering because of his illness). In Coetzee’s Disgrace, the animals at the clinic 
are not denied an awareness of death and Katy is described as being in mourning 
because “no one wants her, and she knows it”.31 In addition, the novel does not 
deny that animals can feel a sense of shame. We will return to the rich set of 
concerns that Derrida explores in his essay in the second chapter of this thesis. 
 
***** 
   
  In modern societies the dog occupies an ambiguous zone between object 
(belonging to a human owner) and a living being. Moreover, as a domestic animal, 
the dog is almost entirely dependent on the human for survival. In his seminal 
essay “Why look at Animals?” John Berger (1980) articulates the complexities of 
this role:   
Is there not one way in which animals, instead of disappearing, 
continue to multiply? Never have there been so many household 
pets as are to be found today in the cities of the richest countries. 
[…] The pet is either sterilised, extremely limited in its exercise, 
deprived of almost all other animal contact, and fed with artificial 
foods. This is the material process which lies behind the truism that 
pets come to resemble their masters or mistresses. They are 















   Berger’s choice of words- “masters”, “mistresses”, “owner”- is telling. Again, 
the implied relation between the animal and the human is one of ownership, 
appropriation, or domination. While Berger’s words about the artificiality of pet 
lives ring true in some ways, in this thesis I want to move away from a negative 
(and belittling) notion of pets as a purely middle class fancy. Here, I move closer 
towards what Donna Haraway, in When Species Meet (2008), reminds us is the root 
of the term ‘companion’: from the Latin cum panis “with bread", thus referencing 
those who break bread together.33 Haraway’s focus sheds light on the aspect of a 
shared domain (because to break bread with someone means that both parties 
inhabit the same space, even momentarily), and also on a crucial link between 
humans and animals: the very physical reality of eating, which forms part of 
numerous other processes we have in common. The breaking of bread and its 
associated meanings of peace and understanding come to the fore in Kundera’s 
novel. Here, Tomas and Karenin literally break bread. This follows from a game 
they’ve established before and which (towards the end of the novel, when Karenin 
is ill) becomes emblematic of Karenin’s inclusion in the unit formed by Tomas 
and Sabina and the mutual love they share: 
He [Tomas] put the roll in his mouth and dropped down on all 
fours opposite Karenin. Then he slowly crawled up to him. […] 
Without moving his body, the dog took the end of the roll sticking 
out of Tomas’s mouth into his own. Then Tomas let go of his end 
so that Karenin could eat it all. […] After a short while, the dog 
responded with some yelps of his own. At last! What they were 
hoping for! Karenin feels like playing! Karenin hasn’t lost the will to 
live!34  
 
   This depiction of shared bread sheds light on another important aspect of 
Karenin’s persona in the novel: his name. Karenin is initially given to Tereza as a 
gift by Tomas when they get married. He is named after one of the protagonists in 
the book Tereza had with her when she first met Tomas, Anna Karenina. The door 
that opens when this name is introduced lets in a lot of dust. For one thing, the 















protagonist Anna, but to her estranged husband. Tomas and Tereza think about 
this and move on to have a discussion about the name. Soon afterwards Tereza 
wonders: “wont calling her Karenin affect her sexuality?”35 Here, even Karenin’s 
sexuality is not “a matter […] left undifferentiated- or neutralised”,36 but is instead 
addressed in numerous parts of the novel. From that moment forth, Karenin is 
referred to as ‘he’ and no longer as ‘it’.    
   Conversely, in Disgrace, Driepoot is consistently referred to as it, and this is 
related to the fact that Lurie “has been careful not to give” Driepoot a name.37 It 
is Bev who names him in reference to his physical deformity (his “withered left 
hindquarter which it drags behind it”).38 Here, Coetzee’s inclusion of a body that 
is not whole highlights a further degree of non-normativity with regards to the 
body. I want to suggest that this is a central preoccupation in both novels. In 
Disgrace, Driepoot’s deformity comes to represent, to a large degree, the ‘animal 
experience’.  
   The differences in naming highlight an important distinction between Karenin 
and Driepoot: the former is granted the subjectivity of great literature (and as I 
argue in the following chapters, is allowed a degree of narrative subjectivity, too), 
while the latter is largely confined to the realm of the body. That Lurie would 
think of including Driepoot in his opera, however, also depicts the emerging 
possibility of inclusion in Coetzee’s novel.39     
   The episodes in naming are fascinating on their own, but they may also be 
looked at in relation to Derrida’s discussion on naming. These episodes are in 
some ways emblematic of the expansive webs these novels cast, and also of the 
border crossings that Karenin and Driepoot as characters in the novels come to 
represent. They also highlight the various avenues of investigation (gender theory, 
animal studies, philosophies of naming, etc) that literary representations of 
animals invite us to visit. 
   In line with this, in this thesis I have consciously ‘inserted’ the animal into areas 
of enquiry where the animal was not explicitly named. I have done this as a way to 
put pressure on existing theories and, indirectly, to highlight the limitations of a 















discuss the rich and complex set of questions that are brought to the fore in an 
engagement with animal companions.    
   In the first chapter of this thesis, “Behaving Like Animals”, we continue to 
discuss the ideas that emerged from Derrida’s reading of Genesis from The Animal 
that therefore I Am. I look specifically at David Velleman’s (2001) reading of this 
biblical myth and the subsequent construction of shame. In addition, I offer a 
reading of some of the sexual encounters that take place in the novels to depict 
the ways in which they trouble the notion of shame as being “proper to man, that 
is to say, foreign to animals”.40   
   In the second chapter, “Alternative Lives, Alternative Deaths”, I shadow 
Agamben’s notion of the “mobile border within living man”41 to examine the 
stakes of existing as what Jeff McMahan (2002) has deemed “beings on the 
margins of life”, which include the comatose, foetuses, and animals within its 
conception.42 Moreover, Judith Butler’s work on non-normative, or queer, lives, 
guides my enquiry in that chapter. Therein, the physical deaths of both Karenin 
and Driepoot are seen through the scope of what Freud deemed “the work of 
mourning”.43  
The final part of this dissertation is, of course, a conclusion. But, as its title 
(“More Beginnings”) suggests, it is one that does not attempt to conclude on what 
Derrrida has referred to as the “the question of the animal”. Instead, this thesis 


























Behaving Like Animals   
 
Perhaps the woman stood frequently in front of the mirror 
observing her body, trying to peer through it into her soul, as 
Tereza had done since childhood. Surely she, too, had harbored the 
blissful hope of using her body as a poster for her soul. But what a 
monstrous soul it would have to be if it reflected that body, that 
rack of four pouches.  
- The Unbearable Lightness of Being, 137-138. 
 
‘The Church Fathers had a long debate about them, and decided 
they don’t have proper souls,’ he observes. ‘Their souls are tied to 
their bodies and die with them.’ Lucy Shrugs. ‘I’m not sure that I 
have a soul. I wouldn’t know a soul if I saw one.’ 
- Disgrace, 78-79.  
 
On close inspection, all literature is probably a version of the 
apocalypse that seems to me rooted, no matter what its 
sociohistorical conditions might be, on the fragile border 
(borderline cases) where identities (subject/object, etc.) do not exist 
or only barely so-double, fuzzy, heterogeneous, animal, 
metamorphosed, altered, abject. 
-Powers of Horror, 207. 
 
   One of the most discordant tales in Kundera’s novel is the one that tells the 
story of Stalin’s son who “habitually left a foul mess” in the latrine of the German 
camp he was imprisoned in during World War II.44 He is unable to stand the 
humiliation that he, “the Son of God (because his father was revered like God)”, 
defecates. He is accused “of being dirty” 45 and commits suicide by running onto 
the electrified fence that surrounds the camp. “Stalin’s son,” the narrator tells us, 
“laid down his life for shit”.46 What his death highlights, we are further told, is the 
“vertiginously close” relation between the “sublime” and the “paltry”: the desire 
for a link to the divine, and the reality of the physical body. 47 The narrator goes 
on to trace this relation from different Gnostic and theological viewpoints.48 The 
death of Stalin’s son, therefore, is no trivial matter. It sheds light on a 
metaphysical question49 that casts its shadow over other characters in the novel. 
As Guy Scarpetta (1987) notes, Stalin’s son’s conundrum explores the duality of 















image of God" but needing to shit every day”. 50  In this way, Scarpetta sees 
defecation “in metonymic relation to original sin, to the indelible stain of the 
species”.51 The word “stain” can here be figured as the one left from physical 
processes (which we share with other animals), and can be further thought of as 
the burden of shame, which in Genesis is attributed only to the human and is again 




   The biblical tale of Genesis tells us that in the Garden of Eden Adam and Eve 
"were both naked” and “were not ashamed".52 However, after eating from the tree 
of knowledge of good and evil, both their eyes "were opened, and they knew that 
they were naked; and they sewed fig leaves together and made themselves 
aprons”.53  
The question of what exactly Adam and Eve were made aware of has vexed 
readers for centuries. In an article titled “The Genesis of Shame”, David Velleman 
(2001) takes an original stance in his reading of this biblical tale. He suggests that 
the knowledge gained from eating the forbidden fruit had little to do with a 
discovery of the possibility of sexual encounter between Adam and Eve, which 
surely they knew from before given that they had already been commanded by 
God to “be fruitful and multiply”, and had cleaved to each other “and become 
one flesh”.54 “The knowledge gained from the tree,” claims the writer,  
was not physically extracted from the fruit itself [...] it was 
knowledge gained in the act of eating the fruit [...and] was gained in 
practice only after having been suggested in theory, by the serpent. 
What the serpent put into Eve's ear as a theory, which she and 
Adam went on to prove in practice, was the idea of disobedience: 
"You don't have to obey".55  
 
   Interestingly, Velleman views the challenge to obedience as lying in a negation 
of the godly command to “be fruitful and multiply”. He notes that Adam and Eve 















actions of their bodies, but that this could be overturned (and visibly so) by 
physical desire.56 This newfound knowledge thus brings forth “if not the idea of 
saying "no" to sex, then at least the idea of saying "not here" and "not now””.57 In 
this way the writer traces the idea of shame into the domains of the public and the 
private. This requires a specific place and time in which to perform certain bodily 
acts, including sexual ones. It entails not only recognition of privacy and 
transgression, but also an awareness of the role of the body (now refigured as 
culpability) in this transgression. In a way, observes Velleman, “the serpent’s 
message of disobedience did convey a piece of sexual knowledge, after all”.58  
For Velleman, then, the biblical quote about Adam and Eve’s eyes being opened 
hinges on the difference between looking and seeing. It is not that Adam and Eve 
were blind before eating the fruit, or that they were not naked, but that they 
became conscious of their nudity and the possibilities inherent in that. The denial 
to “be fruitful and multiply” is one of these. The difference between looking and 
seeing thus marks the conventional split between the animal and the human, the 
body and the mind, being and knowing.  
In line with this, Velleman states that privacy “is made possible by the ability to 
choose in opposition to inclination”.59 In other words, it is made possible only 
through a conscious negation of instincts. At this point, he falls in line with “the 
old Churchfathers” spoken of by Lurie in Disgrace. 60 He states: 
To a creature who does whatever its instincts demand, there is no 
space between impulse and action, and there is accordingly less 
space between inner and outer selves. Because a dog has relatively 
little control over its impulses, its impulses are legible in its 
behaviour. Whatever itches, it scratches (or licks or nips or drags 
along the ground), and so its itches are always overt, always public. 
By contrast, our capacity to resist desires enables us to choose 
which desires our behaviour will express.61  
  
   For the writer, the process of knowing what to do in public and what to leave 
for the private domain requires making “your noises and movements [...] 















interpretable as such”.62 It means being able to wear a social mask that limits what 
is done in public and separates it from the private. The writer is careful to note 
that “self-presentation is not a dishonest activity” because   
there is nothing dishonest about choosing not to scratch wherever 
and whenever it itches. Although you don't make all of your itches 
overt, in the manner of a dog, you aren't falsely pretending to be 
less itchy than a dog.63 
 
    For Velleman, it comes down to knowing which itch to scratch, and where to 
scratch it. The failure to conform to this, either through inability, ignorance or 
defiance, signals a transgression that aligns the transgressor with animals. In the 
end, “our sense of privacy”, becomes intricately woven with “an expression of our 
personhood”, which animals are here denied.64 What is interesting here is that the 
notion of privacy finds its origin in humanity’s first consciousness. This marks the 
split between an interior invisible realm (the mind or soul) and our visible 
presence (the body). In the tale of Genesis, the animals did not eat from the 
forbidden tree, thus remained innocent of that transgression, and of the 
subsequent punishments related to that fall (including expulsion from Eden and 
the burden of shame). That they are relieved of blame, however, has initiated 
them into another type of fall: they are seen as different and separate to the 
human. This has been a form of punishment, and has led to subsequent 
punishments. In our colloquial use of the term, even calling someone “shameless” 
has negative connotations.       
   Velleman’s analysis of shame, although riddled with an overt sense of what 
Richard Ryder in 1970 coined “speciesism”,65 sheds light on the role of the body 
in relation to shame. That is, shame entails an acute awareness of the body and its 
actions. Therefore, at least since Genesis, shame can be thought of as a human 
attribute. A denial of the body or its desires (whether it be scratching an itch, 
passing gas or fornicating) signals an ability to control the body and its urges, thus 
safeguarding against shame. To control these urges is seen as an element of 
separation from the ‘animal kingdom’ (which becomes characterised as lacking in 















words, shame can be said to belong to the descendants of the fallen, and thus be 
seen as a factor that distinguishes them from animals.  
   The biblical tale of Genesis forms a crucial backdrop for our understanding of 
both these novels. Coetzee’s Disgrace makes several subtle references to it (even in 
its title)66 and Kundera’s novel contains longer, more detailed, references to the 
Fall and specifically to the consequences on the treatment of animals.67 As I stated 
earlier, one of the elements that link these two novels is a preoccupation with the 
‘human’ and a persistent testing of the limits between the human and the animal. I 
want to argue that the idea of shame as being a typically human attribute is thrown 
into disarray in various ways in both these novels. The title of this chapter is 
indebted to the many sexual encounters that take place in both novels and to 
thinking through some of the ways in which these acts complicate, rather than 




   Kundera’s novel was published a few years before Derrida’s The Animal that 
therefore I am, and both texts take to heart the notion that animals, unlike Adam 
and Eve, were never expelled from Eden. The narrator of The Unbearable Lightness 
of Being makes the incisive (and comic) observation that “of course, Genesis was 
written by a man, not a horse”.68 This gesture alone signals a change from reading 
Genesis as only a tale consisting of human protagonists and human consequence, 
and instead shifts the attention to the role of animals. The taken-for-granted 
supremacy of humans (and male humans at that) above other animals is explained 
as being so entrenched in human outlook, however, that to recognise it would 
only be possible from the point of view of “a third party […] a Martian [… a] 
non-man”. 69  Velleman’s astute description of the human as a “self-presenting 
creature” is relevant to us here as it discloses the human as one who makes absent, 
or hides, aspects of one’s life.70 One way to do this is through language. As the 
word “hides” connotes, this can be a conscious decision, and can have baleful or 
otherwise treacherous implications. The human fall from grace, after all, rests 















   There are constant references to the body, the invasion of privacy and the 
dislodgement of language in The Unbearable Lightness of Being. Kundera’s novel 
depicts various scenarios where language, or even simple conversations between 
friends, are used to create suspicion and are the origin of trickery, hypocrisy or 
deceit. The weekly radio show that broadcasts the “montage of private 
conversations recorded with the latest bugging devices by a Czech spy who had 
infiltrated the émigré community” is an example of this.72 The horror that these 
shows inspire in the listening audience is not so much concerned with what is said 
(which is acknowledged as being the same things everyone else is saying) as with 
the fact that the private is made known publically. The dismantling of the 
boundaries between the private and the public is made more threatening by the 
inclusion of words and expressions that call forth an (unseen) animal cluster. In 
the passage from where this quote is taken, the description of the unaware 
speakers as having “their every step dogged”, and words and phrases such as 
“bugging devices”, the “strength and vitality of an ox” and “bugged” depict this.73 
There is something decidedly un-human, inhumane, in making public news of 
private matters. What is threatened here is not only one’s privacy, but one’s sense 
of what it means to be human when living within a social body that routinely 
ignores the borders one has set up.  
   The issue of borders is, of course, an important aspect of The Unbearable 
Lightness of Being. Borders are instrumental in guiding the events of the novel, 
which is set during the Prague Spring of 1968. Thus, it set at a time when 
Czechoslovakia’s own borders (in the sense of physical or geographical markers) 
are invaded by the Soviet army. This invasion itself forms the basis for the 
transgression of a number of other borders, not least the ones that demarcate the 
private realm from the public one (as we saw in the discussion on the recorded 
conversations). Moreover, the novel was published in installments in 1984, when 
Kundera was in exile74 and at a time in which other notorious borders still divided 
the European continent (the Berlin Wall would only come down in 1989). This 
division, made literal by walls, casts its shadow in the novel: 
Since the days of the French Revolution, one half of Europe has 















one or the other by means of the theoretical principles it professes 
is all but impossible. And no wonder: political movements rest not 
so much on rational attitudes as on the fantasies, images, words, and 
archetypes that come together to make up this or that political 
kitsch.75   
  
   Nevertheless, geographical borders mark the life of various characters in the 
novel. Franz, for instance, in his search for “the fantasy of the Grand March”,76 
initiates the fateful trip to the border between Cambodia and Thailand, only to 
not be allowed to cross, and is later killed.77     
   The crossing of borders has similarly negative consequences for Tomas and 
Tereza when they emigrate from Czechoslovakia to Switzerland. When Tereza 
unexpectedly returns to Prague, Tomas has the startling realisation that: 
the borders between his country and the rest of the world were no 
longer open. No telegrams or telephone calls could bring her back. 
The authorities would never let her travel abroad. Her departure 
was staggeringly definitive.78   
 
   On his return to Czechoslovakia, Tomas is “welcomed by columns of Russian 
tanks”.79 The ironic reference to his homecoming signals a border (marked by a 
row of Russian tanks that take half an hour to pass) that he will not be able to 
cross again. His return is also “staggeringly definitive” and Tomas and Tereza live 
out the rest of their days in the countryside. Curiously, various critics writing 
about Kundera’s novel have focused on (or formulated) other imaginary (or 
imagined) borders in the novel. These borders have been used to separate 
characters into groups, which in fact mimics a move taken by the ever-present 
narrator of The Unbearable Lightness of Being: “We all need someone to look at us. 
We can be divided into four categories according to the kind of look we wish to 
live under…”.80 For instance, in her analysis of Kundera’s oeuvre, Gurstein (2003) 
signals “three kinds of characters or ideal types”.81 These are “the vulgarian, the 
liberationist, and the modest person”.82 Gurstein states that “whether from hubris 















Book of Laughter and Forgetting] are unable to recognize, as Tereza does, that there 
are definite limits to experience, lest one finds oneself trapped on the other side of 
"the border"”. 83  Similarly, the French writer and critic Guy Scarpetta (1987), 
writing about sexuality in The Unbearable Lightness of Being, states that the novel 
“places in opposition romantic obsession, which seeks THE woman in every 
woman, and can only lead to disappointment, and the libertine obsession, whose 
donjuanism aims at the uniqueness of each woman, her "formula"”.84 The initial 
distinction Scarpetta draws between romantic and sexual obsessions leads him to 
further divide the characters into groups. That Scarpetta first divides them on the 
basis of sexual difference (“on the masculine side…as for the women…”)85 seems 
inadequate given that, as I intend to show, the novel is particularly concerned with 
a careful dismantling of static notions of gender, traditional sexual roles (the 
passive woman and the dominant male) or even species lines. We can thus 
usefully rework his analysis into a division of those that are “inept at libertinage” 86 
(Franz and Tereza) and those that thrive in the physicality of the body (Tomas, 
Sabina and Tereza’s mother). There is some truth in Scarpetta’s naming of this 
latter group as those that “rehabilitate shit and wallow in it”.87 These divisions also 
form the backbone to the structure of the novel, specifically in the two separate 
chapters titled ‘Soul and Body’.  
   One way to articulate what is meant by the ‘border’ that Gurstein and other 
critics hint at but do not explain, is to say that it relates to the complex (and 
somewhat equally imagined) boundaries between the human and the animal. That 
these boundaries cause anxiety in some characters, and that even critics of the 
novels struggle to define it, is telling. It hints, if not exactly at the non-existence of 
a border, then at least at what Giorgio Agamben has deemed “first of all […] a 
mobile border”, 88 one that is permeable to change and is in that way dependant 
on the social situations in which it exists. 
   I want to maintain the links that critics have drawn between the transgression of 
purity and sin, shame and shamelessness, or have simply called the “border”, but I 
want to add that these divisions also hinge on the duality between the body and 















important division in the novel between the animal and the human, which the 




   “The point where difference and identity undecidedly converge for Kundera,” 
writes Terry Eagleton, “is above all sexuality, linking as it does the unrepeatable 
quality of a particular love-relationship with the ceaselessly repetitive, tediously 
predictable character of the bodily drives”.89 Here, then, Eagleton presents us with 
a simple, but sophisticated, description of the ‘undecided convergence’ of two 
fundamental aspects of the novel: the physical and the spiritual. The complex, and 
seemingly incongruous, relation between these two poles falls most heavily on 
Tereza in the novel, who we are told repeatedly by the narrator has, since 
childhood, “stood frequently in front of the mirror observing her body, trying to 
peer through it into her soul”.90 It is from her perspective, after all, that the idea of 
the body as the ‘seat of the soul’ begins to be dismantled. Through her eyes, for 
instance, we see breasts that are not idealised but instead described as “quivering 
pouches” that do nothing more than spray “tiny drops of cold water right and left” 
when leaving the sauna.91 Similarly, her thoughts make us imagine the buttocks as 
“two enormous sacks”.92 There is, however, something decidedly honest in the 
description of these two body parts, for in their shape and dimension, they may 
certainly resemble the roundness of a bag (“pouch” or “sack”). Here, Tereza does 
not know the woman whose body she is describing, thus is able to look on her 
(her physical qualities) in a detached manner, without seeking out her ‘soul’ (as she 
attempts to do with herself in front of the mirror). The language she uses reflects 
this and is devoid of emotional touches that would ‘dress up’ her descriptions. In 
a way then, her language is as naked as the woman is. 93  This shows that, if 
language has the capacity to adorn and beautify, it is equally able to dress down or, 
in a sense, expose. This same level of objectivity is used by the narrator to 
describe the human face, depicting it as "nothing but an instrument panel 
registering all the body mechanisms: digestion, sight, hearing, respiration, 















interesting because it diminishes a sense of it being attached to the mind, 
rationality or other ‘higher functions’. Instead, it is brought down to the level of 
reflex.  Gurstein observes that this way of seeing the body is related to an attempt 
“to do away with those artifices that embellish or disguise the potentially leveling 
[sic] aspects of bodily functions”.95 What Gurstein does not explain, however, is 
what level these depictions supposedly come to. I argue that what these 
descriptions do is remind us of the physical urges and processes we share with 
other animals, thus humbling a view of the human as superior or as somehow 
more enlightened than animals. “By concentrating on the body,” Gurstein notes, 
every experience is pulled “down to earth, turning spirit into flesh”.96    
   The description of bodies as “flesh” can, moreover, be linked to Tomas’ own 
clinical language used elsewhere in the novel. His profession means he has 
consented, like other doctors, “to spend his life involved with human bodies and 
all that they entail”.97 The emphasis on the body, however, does not diminish the 
sense that there may be more to the human than pure physicality: 
Surgery takes the basic imperative of the medical profession to its 
outermost border, where the human makes contact with the divine. 
[. . .] God, it may be assumed, took murder into account; He did not 
take surgery into account. He never suspected that someone would 
dare to stick his hand into the mechanism He had invented, 
wrapped carefully in skin, and sealed away from human eyes. When 
Tomas first positioned his scalpel on the skin of a man asleep under 
anaesthetic, then breached the skin with a decisive incision, and 
finally cut it open with a precise and even stroke (as if it were a 
piece of fabric - a coat, a skirt, a curtain) , he experienced a brief but 
intense feeling of blasphemy.98  
 
   Here, the body and soul hang together in an uneasy compromise, as they do 
throughout the novel. As Gurstein notes, the description of the “brief but intense 
feeling of blasphemy” that Tomas feels the first time he cuts the skin of the 
patient “compels us to notice how closely the realm of the body is connected to 















parenthetically “(as if it were a piece of fabric- a coat, a skirt, a curtain)” is telling, 
for all these objects are themselves meant to be a cover to the body or, like a 
curtain, to one’s privacy. We can see a link between Tomas (the “defiler of 
privacy”)100 and Tereza’s mother, who we are told liked to parade naked before 
strangers, only to have a sixteen year old Tereza try “to protect her mother’s 
modesty” by quickly closing “the curtains so that no one could see from across 
the street”.101 The underbelly of the “brief but intense feeling of blasphemy”102 
that Tomas experiences is here illustrated in the raucous laughter of Tereza’s 
mother and her friends: 
“Tereza can't reconcile herself to the idea that the human body 
pisses and farts," she said. "What's so terrible about that?" and in 
answer to her own question she broke wind loudly. All the women 
laughed again.103 
 
   Not surprisingly, we are told that Tereza grew up in a home where “there was 
no such thing as shame”.104 In the novel Tereza is frequently described as trying to 
escape, physically and mentally, from the “world of immodesty”105 in which her 
mother lives and to which she has forced her to belong. Her mother’s behaviour 
includes farting in public, blowing her nose loudly, speaking about her sex life, 
loosening her teeth, walking around naked and not closing doors in the house.106 
What horrifies Tereza about her mother is not only that she herself “can't 
reconcile […] the idea that the human body pisses and farts",107 but that her 
mother lets in what Tereza regards as private, to the domain of the public.                  
In her desire to escape from this “world of crudity”,108 Tereza is, in some ways, 
not very different from Stalin’s son, who similarly cannot stand 
the .incompatibility of the “sublime” and the “paltry”.109 Both are constrained by a 
vision of the human that excludes, but cannot exist without, the body.    
   The tension between the holy and the quotidian casts its shadow over many 
parts of the novel. Notably, the duality between the purely physical and the ether-
like spiritual substance that the soul represents is described as “that fundamental 
human experience”.110 This would suggest that animals, including Karenin in the 















argue, however, that through Tereza we gain an additional perspective on the 
animal in the novel. This is depicted through her close relation with Karenin, the 
various dream sequences of bodily vulnerability and the numerous comparisons of 
her to Saint Francis of Assisi, the patron saint of animals and the environment.111    
   In the exploration of this duality, Tereza has recurring nightmares about being 
cast only as a body without a soul. We can think back to the Cartesian divide 
which denies animals a soul, and read Tereza’s horror as depicting explicitly the 
violence of this denial: to be forced to live as only animal is, among other things, 
to be vulnerable to harm. I want to argue that Tereza’s suffering at the cost of 
being considered only a body renders the experience of being only ‘animal’ 
explicit and legible. So while the narrative voice, especially the omniscient narrator, 
allows Karenin’s thoughts to be perceptible, 112  a further dimension of 
comprehensibility is made possible through Tereza who clearly articulates the 
horror of being considered soulless.  
   Tereza likens this to existing in a world which is “nothing but a vast 
concentration camp of bodies, one like the next, with souls invisible”.113 For her, 
this again harks back to her mother’s world, where “all bodies were the same and 
marched behind one another in formation”.114 Tereza experiences a similar horror 
when she recognises that Tomas’ affairs will not stop:    
She had come to him to escape her mother’s world, a world where 
all bodies were equal. She had come to him to make her body 
unique, irreplaceable. But he, too, had drawn an equal sign between 
her and the rest of them: he kissed them all alike, stroked them alike, 
made no, absolutely no distinction between Tereza’s body and the 
other bodies. He had sent her back into the world she tried to 
escape, sent to march naked with the other naked women.115  
 
    In Kundera’s novel, the emergence of the soul (which is never defined but is 
articulated as a non-physical substance) ‘rescues’ the individual from this purely 
physical state. That Tereza yearns to form part of a spiritual, rather than physical, 
domain is made palpable in her desire for books and music, elements that she 















world of crudity surrounding her”.116 Here, Tereza draws a bold line separating 
the world of ‘culture’ from that of the body, which can in other words be 
described as the duality of the mind and the body, or forming part of the nature-
culture divide. That a dog (thus steeped in the natural world) such as Karenin 
should be named after a highly regarded cultural product is thus of interest to us. 
It again draws attention to the complexity of his character and to the wider 
domain of meaning encompassed by his persona in the novel, which we will 
continue to explore in the following chapter.        
   As I have mentioned, the duality of the body and soul remains an enduring (and 
unresolved) concern in the novel, and comes to the fore especially in scenes of 
physical encounter. The sexual encounters that take place in the novel are some of 
these. It is here that words lose “their magic power”,117 which further sheds light 
on the body. Tereza’s affair with the engineer (who may be a spy) is an example of 
this and presents us, moreover, with a way in which the discourse surrounding the 
possession of a soul may be used to condone behaviour or evade a sense of 
wrongdoing or blasphemy.118 The image of Tereza’s soul hovering above the bed 
while she is in the throes of passion with the engineer demonstrates this: 
...the engineer’s hand referred to her body, and she realised that she 
(her soul) was not at all involved, only her body, her body alone [...] 
she also knew that if the feeling of excitement was to continue, her 
soul’s approval would have to keep mute [...] what made the soul so 
excited was that the body was acting against its will; the body was 
betraying it, and the soul was looking on.119 
 
   After Tereza has sex with the engineer, she enters his toilet and defecates. She 
regards this as 
in fact a desire to go to the extreme of humiliation, to become only 
and utterly a body, the body her mother used to say was good for 
nothing but digesting and excreting [...] Nothing could be more 

















   Here, the description of the toilet as “the enlarged end of a sewer pipe” is another 
example of the ability to employ language as tool of embellishment or exposure, 
which is a recurring preoccupation in Kundera’s novel. The narrator explains that 
toilets  
in modern water closets rise up from the floor like white water lilies. 
The architect does all he can to make man ignore what happens to 
his intestinal wastes after the water from the tank flushes them 
down the drain [...] the sewer pipelines reach far into our houses 
with their tentacles, they are carefully hidden from view, and we are 
happily ignorant of the Venice of shit underlying our bathrooms, 
dance halls, and parliaments.121  
 
   This description reveals the “hypocritical”122 construction of toilets that aim to 
disguise their function. Working class toilets, the narrator says, are less inclined to 
be as hypocritical and this is reflected in their modest (purely functional) design. 
Tereza’s mother and her husband belong to this group, hence perhaps their 
depiction as somehow more ‘animal’ and coarse, but also honest. That the 
pipelines in the above quote are described as tentacles that stretch across a 
number of domains (homes, areas of entertainment, and the place of politics) is 
therefore interesting because, once again, it depicts a shared aspect of physicality 
(despite one’s social situation) that “pulls every experience down to earth”.123 Here, 
the aesthetic appeal of a toilet that resembles a water lily, parallels the covering up 
we do with words.  
   The hypocrisy I have just alluded to in terms of Tereza’s absent soul or the 
construction of toilets is visible also in the relationship between Franz and Sabina, 
which is similarly burdened by shame. Tereza’s desire to separate the sublime 
from the physical is comparable to Franz’s desire, when having sex, to seek a 
darkness that calls for an erasure of the limits of the body: “the darkness was pure, 
perfect, thoughtless, visionless, that darkness was without end, without borders; 
that darkness was the infinite we carry within us”.124 For this to function, however, 
Franz establishes a strict set of borders that limits the time and place of his sexual 















but its antithesis”.125 His creation of a “restricted zone of purity” that prohibits 
him from having sex with Sabina in certain places is emblematic of this.126 The 
“independent space” 127 he creates allows him to have sex without feeling he has 
disregarded the border of the zone of purity he has created. Comically, this limits 
“their lovemaking to foreign cities”.128 Franz’s attempts to demarcate a singular 
space, outside of his own conjugal space, illustrates his need to separate his heart 
or head (he is an academic, after all) from what his body craves. The joke here, of 
course, is that in spite of these self-imposed restrictions, Sabina and Franz 
continue their affair. Moreover, Franz falls deeply in love with Sabina and leaves 




   The characters that remain furthest from a hypocritical account of their lives 
and actions are Tomas and Sabina. They are, moreover, the characters most at 
ease with the physical processes and urges of the body. Most notably, for instance, 
Sabina (unlike Tereza) has an orgasm at the thought of defecating in front of one 
of her other lovers, Tomas.129 In various ways, Tomas and Sabina are the most 
‘animalistic’ and shameless of the characters. Another way to explore this is 
through the encounter between Tomas and the stork-woman. 
     After Tomas loses his job, he becomes a window cleaner. This allows to him 
to continue his inconspicuous sexual encounters with all types of women. One of 
these women is referred to as the “stork-woman”130 and is described in terms that 
mingle the animal and the human: “an odd combination of giraffe, stork, and 
sensitive young boy”.131 She initiates a ““do as I do” kind of game” in which she 
mirrors every one of Tomas’ strokes and caress.132 This unsettles and fascinates 
him. On their second encounter she not only fails to comply with his “strip!” 
command (which has been, until now, an unfailing ploy of his) but actually 
counter-commands him to do the same thing.133 She follows his movements along 
his own body and reaches his anus, “mimicking his moves with the precision of a 
mirror”. 134  Her own anus is described with words that suggest Tomas’ own 















ended there with a slight protrusion”. 135  Here, neither Tomas nor the stork-
woman is preoccupied with souls. Equally, no attention is paid to beautiful bodies. 
What comes to the fore is an acceptance of the body’s oddness, or what might 
otherwise be perceived as ugliness.   
   In line with this, the encounter with the stork-woman is replete with adjectives 
of strangeness. These include “bizarre”, “curiosities”, “unusual” and “odd”. 136 
The images of mirrors, glass and water (in many forms: in the toilet, in the bucket, 
in urine, in wine and in sinks) also pervade this scene of sexual encounter. All 
these objects are able to reflect, which recalls the biblical myth founded on 
something that was seen, and also Tereza’s constant looking in the mirror. Yet 
neither Tomas nor the stork-woman feel ‘strange’ or ever catch a glimpse of 
themselves in them. Perhaps what is unusual is that in this scenario of intense 
sensual enjoyment and transgression (both are married to other people and he has 
been sent by his boss to clean her windows), both characters remain, perhaps 
against the reader’s judgement, free of shame. Here, the image of Tomas and the 
stork-woman standing above their garments naked and unashamed, coupled with 
the descriptions of water and wine, call to mind a quasi-religious interaction that is 
at odds with its highly sexualised nature.  
   Scarpetta notes that for characters “who are as far from puritanism as they are 
from pansexualism, from idealism as from naturalism, sexual pleasure presupposes 
the sense of sin”. 137  For Scarpetta this can mean they acknowledge “that the 
consciousness of a stain is necessary, if only for the sake of transgressing that 
consciousness”.138 The prefix (‘pre’) in “presuppose” opens up the reading that 
the characters are in a state prior to this acknowledgement. Like Adam and Eve 
before the Fall, these characters are naked and not ashamed. We can thus read this 
scenario as “a typological return”139 to a time before the Fall (there is a fall of sorts 
in this one, too)140 in the Garden of Eden, before shame was ever felt. This means 
we can refigure these characters’ lack of shame as linking them to Adam and Eve 
before sin, or to animals.   
   What Tomas, Sabina and the stork-woman share is a mutual fascination with the 
hidden aspects of the body (internal organs, intercourse, cleansing or defecation). 















is happy to think that “he carried his way of living with him as a snail carries his 
house”.141 Unlike other characters in the novel, these characters celebrate, rather 




   Crucially, the “right to shame” 142  that Tereza’s mother denies her daughter 
becomes a potent element in the safeguarding of (human) identity and guides the 
attitude and actions taken in Disgrace by Lucy and David. An important distinction 
is that Coetzee’s novel derails the idea of shame as pertaining only to humans. 
The image of the dog Katy “glancing around shiftily as if ashamed to be watched” 
while defecating demonstrates this.143 Equally, we are told that before dying, the 
dogs at the clinic “flatten their ears, [...] droop their tails, as if they too feel the 
disgrace of dying”.144 Here, the word ‘disgrace’ creates an implicit link between the 
dogs and Lurie, who has elsewhere described himself as being “in what I suppose 
one would call disgrace”.145 But not only are the animals in Disgrace able to feel 
shame, they can also identify it: “If, more often than not, the dog fails to be 
charmed, it is because of his presence: he gives off the wrong smell (They can smell 
your thoughts), the smell of shame.”146 By granting animals the right to shame, the 
novel sets up implicit links with the human characters, and thus enlarges the scope 
of consideration regarding the capabilities and emotional lives of animals.  
   Both novels are set in a secular time, and although Coetzee’s Disgrace also relies 
to some degree on a theological vision of transgression and sin, it is not so much 
God’s word that functions as a delineator of transgression. In this novel, the law 
demarcates one’s behaviour in society. In Disgrace the acts that guide this process 
are imagined in detail by Lurie on the day he receives the memorandum “notifying 
him that a complaint has been lodged against him under article 3.1 of the 
university’s code of conduct”. 147  Lurie’s transgression has been to mingle the 
private and the public. That is, in his relations with Melanie, Lurie shifts a public 
relationship (the teacher-pupil relation) to the domain of the private (sexual 
intercourse). He is thus a transgressor of these limits and is made to feel the 















   Lurie, moreover, seems to have a knack for making the private public and for 
retaining his calm in these awkward moments.148 The conscious encroachment of 
Elaine Winter (“chair of his onetime department”) at the supermarket is an 
example of this.149 She “has a trolleyful of purchases, he a mere handbasket” yet 
he obliges her to go before him.150 She is acutely aware that her private life is 
being exposed in front of him by way of the objects she is purchasing, which he 
“then takes some pleasure” in watching her unload.151 
   At the committee of enquiry, Lurie’s refusal to seek forgiveness using “words 
[…] from his heart” 152 speaks back to his own knowledge of words as being 
capable of deceit, words used like whisky in one’s coffee “to lubricate” the 
listener.153 This makes his decision not to “speak from his heart” at the enquiry 
but later to attempt to do so in front of Melanie’s father, Isaacs, interesting.154  
   The problem is that the language Lurie uses to explain his actions is anything 
but “naked”,155 it is riddled with otherworldly allusions that take the listener “in 
circles”.156 This, I suggest, can be seen as a factor that distances him from the 
event itself, and his complicity in it. He expresses his own rising desire as 
emerging “from the quiver of Aphrodite, goddess of the foaming waves”157 and 
describe his violation of Melanie first as “not rape, not quite that”,158 then vaguely 
as an inappropriate desire 159  and, finally, as having been the work of Eros. 160 
Although he does not make a recognisable connection between his violation of 
Melanie and his daughter’s own rape, this is something that other voices in the 
novel put pressure on. Lucy’s assertion that “you are a man, you ought to know” 
highlights the proximity of these two separate events.161   
   Like Cooper in her paper “Metamorphosis and Sexuality” (2005), I am 
interested in “the deployment of sexuality in the framework of allusion and under 
the aegis of myth”.162 For Cooper, the “dense allusiveness and intricate play with 
mythic possibilities” this opens up implies that “Coetzee’s fascination with 
sexuality in Disgrace is deeply shaped by language and the various symbolic forms 
it gives to instinct and desire”.163 In her analysis Cooper is concerned with the 
manner in which these allusions create an “interplay of desire with scholarship 
and knowledge” that (because they deal with ‘imported ideas’) frames the 















epistemological structures in South Africa”.164 I, on the other hand, want to argue 
that the allusions created by Lurie in his descriptions are at once an attempt to 
denounce shame, and are conducive to a demarcation between the human and the 
animal. This boundary-making is betrayed by references to Lurie’s own “urgencies 
of passion”165 and by the animalised descriptions of sex and rape that casts their 
shadows in the novel.  
   We can think this along what Cooper has deemed a “narrative derailing”,166 
which is the disjuncture between the event and its retelling. This has the effect of 
displacing the teller of the story when the event is removed from how the teller 
views him or herself. This is a concern in Coetzee’s novel and can be seen in 
Lurie’s retelling of his involvement with Melanie and in Lucy’s silence concerning 
her rape. Thus, even as Lurie’s use of mythical allusions to describe his violation 
of Melanie can be seen to distance him from his actions, the recurrent image of 
Eros also alters “the terms of exchange between spirit and flesh, divine and 
human”.167 This means that Lurie’s version of sexual intercourse displaces a purely 
‘human’ account of events in that it mingles “both the divine and the bestial” and 
in its mythic conception “dislocates the human” as the sole agent of the event.168 I 
don’t agree with Cooper’s strict separation of “the divine and the bestial” because 
it paints a picture of complete separation between the human and the animal. In 
this way, it implies that there are (unshared) aspects that are proper to the human, 
thus demarcating an imagined, dualistic and perhaps harmful line of separation 
from the animal. But we can usefully employ the notion of this mingling of 
human and animal qualities (and maintain that they are inseparable) to reveal the 
impulsive, rather than rational, nature of Lurie’s affair. This harks back to our 
discussion on Genesis earlier in this chapter, specifically the insistence on a lack of 
control over the body (its functions and desires) as being linked to shame. While 
we may read, then, Lurie’s words in the novel as attempting a degree of separation 
from the event and from himself as animal, the narrative nonetheless derails this 
vision by associating his image with the other-than-human aspects he describes. In 
this vein, a critic recently made the following astute observation: 
The beginning and middle of the novel are characterized by a 















libido as animalistic but appeals to the concept when it helps him 
justify his behaviour. When Lurie has sex with Melanie […], he 
imagines the event to be motivated purely by instinct and thus to be 
removed from the responsibility of the involved parties, just as 
animals are not responsible for their behaviour.169  
    
   This then begs the crucial question: 
Is it possible that the same god that made him seduce Melanie acts 
through the rapists, the same god that dignifies even dogs by his 
presence, as he explained to Lucy only minutes ago?170  
  
   The difficulty of answering this question ties into Lurie and Lucy’s different 
approaches to these transformative events. Lucy refers to her rape as “a purely 
private matter” which her father interprets as rooted in “some form of private 
salvation”.171 Later, Bev reiterates Lucy’s position of privacy when she tells Lurie 
“you weren’t there […] You weren’t”172 which echoes Lucy’s earlier “you don’t know 
what happened”. 173  This outrages Lurie because he is “being treated like an 
outsider”.174 This is precisely the point. Lucy refuses to “come out before these 
strangers”175 because they are strangers to the experience she has undergone and 
to her pain. In her silence, she exercises her “right not to be put on trial […] not 
to have to justify” herself.176 In this way, she is not unlike her father in his own 
‘trial’, both are holding fast to a vision of themselves that is contradicted, or 
derailed, by the events. Both silences are a mask: “Lucy’s secret, his disgrace”.177 
   On the other hand, Elleke Boehmer (2002) has read Lucy’s silence as 
embedding “in herself, her body, the stereotype of the wronged and muted 
woman, the abused and to-be-again-abused of history: she becomes, in a phrase, 
the figure of a double silence”. 178  Boehmer’s reading of Disgrace critiques the 
implications of Lucy’s silence as implying “as ever” the idea that women are 
required “the generic pose of suffering in silence”.179 This view echoes the novel’s 
own narration: 
Bev responds only with a terse shake of the head. Not your business, 















aftermath: blood-matters, a woman’s burden, women’s preserve.180  
   
   I want to argue that we may also read Lucy’s need for silence as tied into her 
own conception of herself, and not (as Boehmer’s paper suggests) as an allegorical 
representation of Melanie or of all women. After all, Melanie did lodge a 
complaint and she appeared before the committee of enquiry the day before 
Lurie.181 Lucy’s silence, therefore, is distinct from Melanie’s silence. It offers Lucy 
a means to safeguard her own individual identity (rather than become another 
statistic), and of keeping her (private) identity outside the public domain. The 
manner of her rape, commencing as it did in an invasion of her private space (her 
home), and by numerous men means that the event and her persona have been 
rendered public. To amplify this, she later comes into contact with one of the men 
in public (at Petrus’ party), thus further intensify the degree to which her private 
pain has become a public matter. Lucy attempts to safeguard (and perhaps, 
recuperate) her dignity by treating her rape as private. In this way she is implicitly 
not “taking on this doglike status”182 or “becoming reconciled to the point of 
conventional object” 183  as Boehmer suggests, but rather retaining her own 
subjective story and separating herself from a sexual act that has otherwise been 
described in animalistic terms: 
‘You think they will come back?’ 
‘I think I am their territory. They have marked me. They will come 
back for me.’ […] ‘They spur each other on. That’s probably why 
they do it together. Like dogs in a pack.’184 
 
             And: 
They were not raping, they were mating. It was not the pleasure 
principle that ran the show but the testicles, sacs bulging with seed 
aching to perfect itself.185  
 
   As I stated before, the mixing of mythic and animal elements in the retelling of 
events is not flattering to human agency or ideas about the scope of what is 















highlight the animal within. That these (negative) descriptions come up in times of 
violence or trauma is telling, and also problematic. When Lurie finds Pollux, one of 
the rapists (whose name bears significant mythical roots)186 spying from a window 
on his daughter in the shower, for instance, the insult he repeatedly screams is “You 
swine! […] You filthy swine!”187 He later refers to him as being “like a jackal sniffing 
around, looking for mischief”.188 When Lucy’s wrapper slips loose to reveal her 
breasts, Pollux looks on “unashamedly”.189 His lack of shame here is linked to 
something being “wrong with him, wrong in his head”.190 He is animalised by being 
denied a position as a thinking, or rational, individual. In this way he is relegated to 
the domain of animals: he can feel when he is hurt and react (“’Ya, ya, ya, ya , ya’ he 
shouts in pain”) 191  but his mental deficiency recasts him, too, as “morally 
deficient”.192 In this way, he is seen as less-than-human. Lucy’s protection of him is 
equally problematic and is also implicitly seen by Lurie as linked to her mental state: 
“more and more she has begun to look like one of those women who shuffle 
around the corridors of nursing homes whispering to themselves”.193 The grotesque 
results of human and animal mingling finds its culmination in Lurie’s dismayed 
avowal that “like a weed he [Pollux] has been allowed to tangle his roots with Lucy 
and Lucy’s existence”.194 
   To say that these depictions of an animalised humanity are constructed along 
supposed racial lines, however, is incorrect. 195 Lurie’s own desires are also linked 
to animals (his own analogy between the “excited and unmanageable” golden 
retriever and himself is an example).196 He, too, is berated for not ‘learning his 
lesson’ and is told to “stay with your own kind”.197 In fact, Lurie’s desire for 
Melanie, which is described as “the seed of generation, driven to perfect itself, 
driving deep into the woman’s body, driving to bring the future into being”198 is a 
precursor to his thoughts about the rapists as “mating” 199 with his daughter. The 
distinction here is that Lurie embellishes his desire in lofty quotations: “sooner 
murder an infant than nurse unacted desires”. 200  These may veil, but do not 


















   We may come to view shame in The Unbearable Lightness of Being and in Disgrace as 
singularly attached to the body, its functions and to the exposure that it is bound 
to by merely being a body. Here, I am thinking specifically of Judith Butler’s 
conception of the body as that which shatters the boundaries between an inside 
(the private) and the outside (the public):“this disposition of ourselves outside 
ourselves [which] seems to follow from bodily life, from its vulnerability and its 
exposure”.201 Fundamentally, language (in the form of bodily descriptions, Lurie’s 
embellishment, or Lucy’s silence) becomes a constituent of the body and of the 
safeguarding of shame. I have argued that the infringement of one’s private 
persona threatens not only one’s privacy, but one’s own sense of ‘humanity’. The 
fact that it may be threatened shows that it is not static or stable. The public arena 
is in both novels figured as a threatening locale, in that it is here that one’s shame 
is exposed. The links between the body, sex and shame seem to threaten a 
conception of the human, of exposing animal traces within its domain. I have 
argued that more than threatening this (recognisable yet inexplicable) border 
between the human and the animal, this web depicts the porosity of the ‘border’, 
its constructed nature, and its flexibility. This ushers in the artificiality of the vision 
du monde in which the animal and the human are separate and disconnected entities. 
Both novels show us that the sounds, acts and thoughts that bridge this divide are 
often misread (by characters in the novels and by critics of the novels), or 
otherwise read in predominantly negative terms. Those that speak only in the 




















Alternative Lives, Alternative Deaths 
 
'This dog,' answered Eumaeus, 'belonged to him who has died in a 
far country. If he were what he was when Odysseus left for Troy, he 
would soon show you what he could do. There was not a wild beast 
in the forest that could get away from him when he was once on its 
tracks. But now he has fallen on evil times, for his master is dead 
and gone, and the women take no care of him. Servants never do 
their work when their master's hand is no longer over them, for 
Zeus takes half the goodness out of a man when he makes a slave 
of him.' 
So saying he entered the well-built mansion, and made straight for 
the riotous pretenders in the hall. But Argos passed into the 
darkness of death, now that he had seen his master once more after 
twenty years. 
 
- Odyssey, Book 17 
 
Dogs do not have many advantages over people, but one of them is 
extremely important: euthanasia is not forbidden by law in their case; 
animals have the right to a merciful death. […] Assuming the role of 
Death is a terrifying thing. Tomas insisted that he would not give 
the injection himself; he would have the vet come and do it. But 
then he realised that he could grant Karenin a privilege forbidden to 
humans: Death would come for him in the guise of his loved ones.  
 
- The Unbearable Lightness of Being, 299-300. 
 
Should he mourn? Is it proper to mourn the death of beings who 
do not practise mourning among themselves? Looking into his heart, 
he can find only a vague sadness. 
  
- Disgrace, 127. 
 
 
   Soon after Tereza learns of Karenin’s terminal illness, she has a “sacrilegious 
thought” that she cannot get rid of: “the love that tied her to Karenin was better 
than the love between her and Tomas.”202 This thought occurs right after the 
discussion of Genesis and the role of animals that we explored in the previous 
chapter of this thesis. The word ‘sacrilegious’ finds its roots in the idea of a 
transgression of that which is held to be sacred.203 That Tereza would feel this in 















sinister or otherwise anti-social tones that underline an individual who displays a 
close relation with an animal. Second, the guilt associated with mourning the 
death of an animal is by this word confined to the domain of a transgression, of 
something that should not be done. In this case, it is perhaps because it appears to 
take precedence over a human relation, the one she shares with Tomas. Tereza is 
aware of this and we are told that as a result she must hide it “more than she 
would an affair”.204 Nevertheless, the thought that she may live on longer than 
Karenin is unbearable to her: “her home was Karenin, not Tomas. Who would 
wind the clock of their days when he was gone?”205 
   The importance of Karenin in Tereza’s life means his death is imbued with 
meaning. As such, it is preceded by careful planning and followed by a period of 
extended mourning. On a structural level his death spans the entire last section of 
the novel in the chapter titled ‘Karenin’s Smile’.206 In contrast to this, the death of 
the two main human protagonists is announced in a single paragraph less than 
half way into the novel.207 This means that as readers we read the rest of the novel 
knowing that the protagonists will die without addressing it in a substantial 
manner, whereas we experience Karenin’s illness and death in detail.   
On the other hand, in Disgrace many types of animals meet their death at the 
hands, or guns, of humans. Very few of these animals are mourned. On a 
structural level, Driepoot’s death is never explained; it is only announced in the 
final line of the novel, which is also the last thing we hear from Lurie: “Yes, I am 
giving him up”.208 So while Karenin’s death in various ways marks the end of an 
era for Tereza and Tomas, the death of Driepoot in Disgrace is one among many 
other deaths. In this chapter I suggest that Driepoot’s death forms part of a wider 
social system, in which death is one of the very few options available to homeless 
animals. In this sense, Driepoot’s death is not an end, it is a continuation.  
What can we make of these grand discrepancies and how might the inclusion of 
animals as figures of non-normative lives relate to this? The importance of this 
question is alluded to in the title of this chapter: ‘Alternative lives, Alternative 
deaths’. The idea of non-normative life is one that I have borrowed from Jeff 
McMahan and Judith Butler. McMahan speaks of “beings on the margins of 















irreversibly comatose or those who suffer from brain damage or dementia, and 
animals. What all these lives hold in common is that they are considered as lacking 
consciousness or, in the case of the comatose, exist in a state of disrupted 
consciousness. In this sense, they could be considered ‘animal’ in that they are 
marked predominantly by their bodily (rather than mental) state. Judith Butler’s 
work is largely concerned with queer or otherwise non-normative lives. Her work 
on mourning and loss informs my thoughts in the following section. 
      In her essay ‘Violence, Mourning, Politics’ (2006), Butler performs a 
psychoanalytic reading of loss and grief. Freud’s much-used phrase “the work of 
mourning” gains resonance in Butler. 210 She proposes a view of mourning as an 
ongoing and transformative state, one that alters the individual or the community 
indefinitely: 
[…] One mourns when one accepts that by the loss one undergoes 
one will be changed, possibly forever. Perhaps mourning has to do 
with agreeing to undergo a transformation (perhaps one should say 
submitting to a transformation) the full result of which one cannot 
know in advance. There is losing, as we know, but there is also the 
transformative effect of loss, and this latter cannot be chartered or 
planned.211  
 
   In his seminal essay ‘Mourning and Melancholia’ (1917) Freud asserts that 
mourning is “regularly the reaction to the loss of a loved person or to the loss of 
some abstraction which has taken the place of one, such as one's country, liberty, 
an ideal, and so on.”212 This means that Freud’s notion of mourning is open to 
include the loss of things or ideals. Butler continues with this notion, but her call 
for recognition of one’s complicity in the life, loss and grief of others presents a 
main point of departure from a Freudian method of analysis. For Butler this 
emerges from complex bonds of sociality. At the heart of her concern are the 
social relations that can emerge from the traumatic events that cause loss and pain. 
For Butler these relations can lead to a sense of solidarity that is socially engaged 
in its formation and adaptation to loss. In this respect, the idea of mourning 















inactive extreme of mourning, which is at odds with Butler’s own conception of 
the possibility of a politicised communal mourning. For Butler, community 
emerges as the central concern and primary component of “the work of 
mourning”.214 In this way she abandons the notion of mourning as constitutive of 
“internal work”215 and opens it up to public display and expression. As a further 
point of divergence, Butler proposes that “we take injurability and aggression as 
two points of departure for political life.”216 She notes: 
What this means, concretely, will vary across the globe. There are 
ways of distributing vulnerability, differential forms of allocation 
that make some populations more subject to arbitrary violence than 
others. 217    
 
   Butler thus notes that what is considered aggression (and, subsequently, 
mourning) is not universal, but instead depends on the location and time in which 
it occurs. Moreover, her notion of mourning implies a non-violent public 
mourning that is turned outwards to engage with a fellow community.218 The 
word ‘community’ itself announces a commonality that transcends the bounds of 
the singular (and at times solitary) individual and encompasses others within its 
reach. Butler theorises this by unravelling the “we” she presupposes by going back 
to the “I”, only to expound that the two are resolutely intertwined and necessary 
to each other:  
I might try to tell a story here, about what I am feeling, but it would 
have to be a story in which the very “I” who seeks to tell the story is 
stopped in the midst of the telling; the very “I” is called into 
question by its relation to the Other.219  
 
And: 
One speaks, and one speaks for another, to another, and yet there is 
no way to collapse the distinction between the Other and oneself. 
When we say “we” we do nothing more than designate this very 















outside ourselves seems to follow from bodily life, from its 
vulnerability and its exposure 220  
    
   This echoes part of our discussion in the introduction to this thesis: that the 
individual is dependent on others (human or not) for self-definition. This 
recognition complicates a notion of the individual as autonomous and pre-existent. 
Rather, it moulds an image of the individual that comes to surface only as a result 
of the relation with others.221 For Butler this means that even our future is “always 
in relation to the Other”.222 Butler’s consistent use of the capital letter in ‘Other’ 
calls to mind a Levinasian approach to the other, which she develops further in 
other parts of Precarious Life.223 This is relevant because there, Butler focuses on 
the Levinasian notion of the face as not being exclusively a human face.224  
   As part of our exposure to others, Butler introduces the body as a material 
presence in the discussion of vulnerability and susceptibility to loss, pain and grief. 
Butler theorises the body as “a site of desire and physical vulnerability” that 
exposes us to others.225 This refigures the body both as the place that exposes us 
to physical harm and to the experience of the loss of others. She explains:  
The body implies mortality, vulnerability, agency: the skin and the 
flesh expose us to the gaze of others but also to touch and to 
violence. The body can be the agency and instrument of all these as 
well, or the site where "doing" and "being done to" become 
equivocal. Although we struggle for rights over our own bodies, the 
very bodies for which we struggle are not quite ever only our own. 
The body has its invariably public dimension.226 
 
 Butler puts forward “a dimension of political life” that is rooted in the body and 
“that has to do with our exposure to violence and our complicity in it”. 227 Here, 
she proposes “a basis for community” in the conditions of bodily life.228  
   Of course, Butler’s conception of loss and communal mourning is rooted in a 
post 9/11 frame of reference. She speaks directly of the inability to publicly 
mourn or create obituaries for those she refers to as living non-normative or 















killed abroad in wars involving the United States.230 Butler directs her concerns via 
an analysis of “the question of the human” and more specifically, to the 
limitations introduced by a normative vision of the human.231  This normative 
vision dictates not only how lives are lived, but also delineates the limits of 
mourning. The act of making only certain lives publicly grievable can thus be 
refigured as being akin to a censorship of feelings and attitudes directed at non-
normative lives and deaths. Butler states that those that are denied public 
mourning filter into a zone of mass anonymity and are thus deemed unintelligible. 
Their exclusion from acts of public mourning, including the obituary, opens up 
questions of the ‘real’:  
What is real? Whose lives are real? How might reality be remade? 
Those who are unreal have, in a sense, already suffered the violence 
of unrealization. What, then, is the relation between violence and 
those lives considered as “unreal”? [ … ] If violence is done against 
those who are unreal, then, from the perspective of violence, it fails 
to injure or negate those lives since those lives are already 
negated.232 
 
   In ‘Mourning, Violence, Politics’ Butler enquires “…who counts as human? 
Whose lives count as lives? And, finally, what makes for a grievable life?” 233 These 
three questions guide my own enquiry in this chapter. Unlike Butler, I want to 
address these questions, not necessarily as a way to focus as she does on “the 
question of the human”,234 but to explore the dynamics of mourning animal lives 
in The Unbearable Lightness of Being and in Disgrace. The inclusion of animals into this 
enquiry begs another set of questions: how, if we presuppose that animal lives are 
different from human lives, can one mourn the death of an animal? Is this even a 
possibility? What are the implications? 
   Before we turn to this enquiry it is important to mention that the emotional 
texture of Butler’s words, specifically her insistence on the body as a site of 
vulnerability and exposure, bear a striking similarity to Cora Diamond’s in ‘The 
Difficulty of Reality and the Difficulty of Philosophy’. We can relate Butler’s 















something that wounds the individual. That Diamond lays out these thoughts in 
reference to another of Coetzee’s works, Elizabeth Costello, further highlights their 
relevance to us in this chapter: 
The awareness we each have of being a living body, being “alive to 
the world”, carries with it exposure to the bodily sense of 
vulnerability to death, sheer animal vulnerability, the vulnerability 
we share with them. This vulnerability is capable of panicking us. 
To be able to acknowledge it at all, let alone as shared, is wounding; 
but acknowledging it as shared with other animals, in the presence 
of what we do to them, is capable not only of panicking one but 
also of isolating one, as Elizabeth Costello is isolated. Is there any 
difficulty in seeing why we should not prefer to return to moral 
debate, in which the livingness and death of animals enter as facts 
that we treat as relevant in this or that way, not as presences that 
may unseat our reason?235 
 
   In the above extract from Diamond’s essay, the “in this or that way” is used 
almost as an aside. In this chapter, I explore some of the difficulties and 
discontinuities that arise in relation to the death and mourning of animal lives. I 
suggest that while these difficulties do wound the grieving individual, they do so 
in different ways in each novel. Thus, for the purpose of this chapter, the “this or 
that way” becomes increasingly important as a means to discuss these disparities, 
which I aim to show are a result of social relations. These relations, or lack of 
relations, come to direct what Freud referred to as “the economics of pain”.236 
What this means is that mourning takes on special significance when thought 
through in terms of the social bonds that exist before the death of the animal. John 
Berger (1980) has theorised these bonds as being constructed by economic binds. 
He claims that domestic animals are just one part of the ideal middle-class 
household and lifestyle: 
[...] that universal but personal withdrawal into the private small 















outside world, which is such a distinguishing feature of consumer 
societies.237 
    
   Berger’s distinction between an animal as either serving a “useful purpose” 
(hunting, security, mice eating) or being kept “regardless of their usefulness”238 is 
echoed by Lucy in Disgrace when she articulates that in South Africa animals are 
treated as “part of the furniture, part of the alarm system”.239 That Lucy should 
allude to animals as things is significant because it foreshadows the treatment of 
animals, their subsequent deaths and disposal in the novel. In this chapter I will 
focus mostly on Driepoot in Disgrace and Karenin in The Unbearable Lightness of 
Being. That the main dog character in each novel is supposedly killed by euthanasia 
seems a good point at which to begin our discussion. The principal divergence of 




   The term ‘euthanasia’ is generally defined as a gentle or easy death brought 
about especially in the case of an incurable or painful illness. 240  Prominent 
philosopher Jeff McMahan notes that ‘euthanasia’, like ‘suicide’, is a “concept with 
blurred edges”. 241  The act of euthanasia implies an act of killing or letting 
someone die that meets two conditions: “first, that death benefits, or is good for, 
the individual who dies and, second, that the agent must be motivated to do what 
is good for that individual and must intend to benefit the individual in bringing 
about his death”.242 There is an important distinction in the act of euthanasia 
when it comes to human and animal lives. An animal, like other marginal lives 
discussed by McMahan,243 is not able to give or withhold consent regarding the 
termination of his or her life. This means that in these cases euthanasia becomes 
reclassified as “nonvoluntary”.244 Here, the human occupies the role of (active) 
agent in the killing.   
   McMahan makes a further distinction “between killing and letting die”.245 The 
former takes on connotations of agency and control (such as actively injecting a 















more passive position to killing (such as removing a patient from life-support 
system).246 The moral significance of this distinction lies in the “more general 
distinction between doing and allowing”.247 In an active instance of killing, the 
agent is more closely tied to the event. This makes him appear “more responsible 
for it than he would have been if it had occurred even in his absence”.248 For 
McMahan, the difference lies not only in the passive/active continuum but in the 
differential positions between “doing harm” and “allowing harm to occur”.249 The 
former betrays the agent’s complicity in the act of euthanasia or killing, the latter 
relinquishes the sense of responsibility that links the agent to the death.   
This very brief account of euthanasia sheds light on a major difference between 
the death of Karenin in The Unbearable Lightness of Being and Driepoot in Disgrace. 
Karenin is gravely ill, unable to move and in pain. Driepoot is lame in one leg, but 
appears otherwise healthy. This ushers another major distinction between these 
two dogs: Karenin forms part of a unit in Kundera’s novel; Driepoot is essentially 
homeless. Although the focus of this chapter is not on euthanasia, the importance 
of these different deaths is that they form part of the complexities and 
contradictions of mourning non-human lives. This is partly because these lives 
have been actively terminated. 
   Yet in Disgrace, Lurie’s final words are “Yes, I am giving him up”. 250 These 
words blur the distinction between doing and allowing. While his words can be 
read as a confession of active involvement in Driepoot’s killing (the “I”), the 
“giving him up” makes it sound as though there is a third party to which he is 
giving Driepoot up to. Moreover, the words create the impression that Lurie has 
‘fought for’ Driepoot and must now relinquish his will to continue and must give 
(him) up. These words distance Lurie from the act of killing and lend him an air 
of innocence in the act. They are an attempt to veil his involvement in a death 
that he will form a part of. This is also meant to diminish Lurie’s own sense of 
responsibility and remorse, which in the previous chapter I discussed in line with 
other events in the novel.  
   Despite the weight of these distinctions, critics have unanimously referred to 
Lurie’s killing of Driepoot as ‘euthanasia’ and, on the other hand, critics of 















Following McMahan’s thorough analysis of the act, I suggest it is a euphemism to 
call the killing of a healthy animal ‘euthanasia’. The use of a euphemism in this 
case forecloses the scrutiny which the word ‘killing’ would require. McMahan’s 
analysis of the complexities of “convenience euthanasia” is useful to us here. It 
refers to euthanasia performed on an animal that is not necessarily ill or even 
abandoned, but is still killed for the sake of (economic or social) 
convenience. 251 The term ‘convenience’ in this phrase echoes the economic 
dimension that filters through it. I suggest a large number of animals euthanised in 
the welfare state fall into this category. Driepoot is one of these animals. Coetzee’s 
novel does not name it as such, but it is made apparent:  
When people bring a dog in they do not say straight out ‘I have 
brought you this dog to kill,’ but that is what is expected: that they 
will dispose of it, make it disappear, dispatch it to oblivion.252 
 
And:  
One by one he brings in the cats, then the dogs: the old, the blind, 
the halt, the cripple, the maimed, but also the young, the sound- all 
those whose term has come.253 
 
So although both the principal dog characters in the novels are killed, Driepoot’s 
death is somewhat different from the mercy killing that the term ‘euthanasia’ 
implies. The mercy or alleviation involved in Driepoot’s killing is not only directed 
towards him or the other animals ‘put to sleep’ in the clinic. It also alleviates 
pressure from individuals or from the social system that cannot take care of 
unwanted animals. In line with the enquiries of this chapter, this begs the question: 




   Tom Herron notes that “there are animals everywhere in Disgrace”.254 These 
range from ‘actual’ animals such as Driepoot, the bitch Katy and the suffering 















This second category is just as present in the novel. One could open up the novel 
at random and find an example of this. The description of one of Lucy’s rapists as 
“the dull-faced apprentice, the running-dog” is one of these.256   
   David Lurie’s involvement with animals, real and metaphorical, grows as the 
novel develops. By the end of the novel he has begun to call himself, “the dog-
man”,257 which is the title Petrus previously used on himself.258 This self-appointed 
title is interesting because, in this case, the hyphen sets up ambiguity. It could be 
read as the man that looks after the dogs, or as the man that is both dog and man. 
In this way, the term harks back to Cooper’s account of the mingling, if not 
exactly of “both the divine and the bestial”, then at least of the animal and the 
human in Lurie. 259 This sets him up as human and animal, and again displaces a 
purely ‘human’ account of events. Moreover, the idea of the man who is half dog, 
thus a wolf-man, calls to mind Giorgio Agamben’s description of the wolf-man 
from his book State of Exception (1998). Here, the wolf-man is the “bandit and the 
outlaw” of Germanic and Scandinavian antiquity who is banished from his 
community for committing a wrong deed. 260  The image of the “man without 
peace” who is outside the protection of the law and is, moreover, a “hybrid of 
human and animal, divided between the forest and the city” seems applicable to 
Lurie’s state in the novel.261 
   The Animal Welfare Clinic is the point of convergence for the animals he 
encounters. Some of the animals cannot be healed because there is a lack of 
supplies and so for them the clinic is a place of “last resource”.262 By the end of 
the novel, Lurie finds himself implicated in the life of these animals to the extent 
that he feels a sense of responsibility for them even in death. I want to argue that 
although the work done by Bev at the animal clinic serves a necessary purpose 
(she even acts as dentist to some dogs),263 there is a pervasive feeling that some of 
the animals, “leaping with excitement”,264 do not want to die. It then becomes 
difficult to justify killing them. But they are killed nonetheless because, as Bev 
explains, “there are just too many of them”.265 This is a phrase that is echoed later 
in Lurie’s thoughts: “The dogs are brought to the clinic because they are 















   Armstrong (2008) and Clarkson (2009) have both noted that the “too menny” 
in this passage harks back to Thomas Hardy’s novel Jude the Obscure (1895). Here, 
the young Little Father Time kills his younger siblings and then himself in an 
attempt to alleviate the economic hardships of his family. He leaves a letter with 
the exact phrase written on it. In this way, we may read Disgrace (as both these 
critics do) as deeply engaged with the complexities of destitute animals and the 
human responsibility toward them. I want to argue that in Disgrace the problems of 
destitution presents a double bind precisely because humans and animals are 
confined to a similar situation. Consider the following passage: 
The sign outside the clinic reads ANIMAL WELFARE LEAGUE 
W.O. 1529. Below is a line stating the daily hours, but this has been 
taped over. At the door is a line of waiting people, some with 
animals. As soon as he gets out the car there are children all around 
him, begging for money or just staring. He makes his way through 
the crush, and through a sudden cacophony as two dogs, held back 
by their owners, snarl and snap at each other.267 
 
   This excerpt presents us with an unlikely image of shared poverty. The clinic 
itself, were it not for the sign, could just as well be any other welfare institution. 
Those that surround the area (“begging for money or just staring”) are destitute. 
The tape over the hours attests to the lack of regular working hours but also to 
the time that is offered by those like Bev who volunteer their own time and 
services at the clinic. The collective noun “crush” signals the enormity of the 
crowd and, by mere nature of being a crowd, erases the individual nature of the 
people that constitute it. In this way it is like the homogenous terms ‘animal’ and 
‘human’. It is also unlike them because in this case both humans and animals are 
united, albeit in a state of destitution. These lives are expressly united by a shared 
vulnerability that is hastened by poverty.  
   This unity forms part of a wider structural overlapping that takes place in the 
novel. It insistently points towards an intertwined relation between the animal and 
human community in the Eastern Cape and elsewhere. There is, for instance, a 















violence inflicted on the dogs by those same men. These can be deemed ‘losses’ 
(of safety, of life) and lead to a series of conflicted and problematic alliances, not 
least between Lucy and Petrus: 
I don’t believe you get the point, David. Petrus is not offering me a 
church wedding followed by a honeymoon on the Wild Coast. He is 
offering an alliance, a deal. I contribute the land, in return for which 
I am allowed to creep in under his wing. Otherwise, he wants to 
remind me, I am without protection, I am fair game.268 
 
Here, even the language takes on a hue of human-animal mingling. The Wild 
Coast is, of course, a physical location, but we can read the following passage as 
enacting some kind of ‘law of the wild’. Without Petrus’ protection, Lucy is open 
to being hunted (like game, hunted for food or sport) by further men. She is like a 
hurt bird and the help that Petrus can offer in the alliance is akin to the protection 
of a nest, without which she cannot survive.  
   Another alliance that emerges from a situation of loss (of animal lives, of work, 
of sexual desirability) is the one between Bev and David in their combined work 
at the animal clinic. That these two characters have a brief sexual affair is perhaps 
irrelevant in light of the wider reach that their combined work has on the 
community. This is done in spite of the fact that the clinic should be funded by 
the government but instead depends on volunteers, fundraisers and donations.269    
   The shared precariousness introduced by descriptions of poverty is something 
that trails on unto death. Like the sign at the animal shelter, the fence at the 
incinerator “has long ago been cut through; the gate and the notice are simply 
ignored”.270 Here, there is a crowd of women, children and vagrants who wait to 
pick through the waste in search of “syringes, pins, washable bandages, anything 
for which there is a market, but particularly for pills, which they sell to muti shops 
or trade in the streets”.271 We are presented here with an obvious problem. The 
shared destiny that the novel depicts for poor humans and animals makes it 
appear as though poverty makes animals of humans, and that the state of poverty 
















He comes, he does his work, he goes; he does not form part of the 
society of which the incinerator, despite the wire fence and the 
padlocked gate and the notice in three languages, is the hub.272 
 
   Nevertheless, his contact with the corpses of the dogs snaps into focus the 
harsh reality of their material existence. The distance that separated him from the 
“burning offal”273 on the farm is here diminished as he is the one introducing the 
bodies into the nearby fire. Lurie can no longer deny the materiality of the animal 
corpses or his role in their death. Or can he? 
Before we return to this question, we can link this further to the incident with 
the Persian sheep. When Lurie contemplates buying the sheep from Petrus he 
comes to the conclusion that he would accomplish very little: 
Petrus will only use the money to buy new slaughter-animals, and 
pocket the difference. And what will he do with the sheep anyway, 
once he has bought them out of slavery? Set them free on the 
public road? Pen them up in the dog-cages and feed them hay?274  
 
   We should note that both “slaughter-animals” and “dog-cages” have been 
turned into hyphenated nouns. The hyphen could have been avoided in both 
cases and can be read as visual representations of both the knives (used to 
slaughter) and the cages (where animals are kept). I want to argue that the 
hyphen in these words marks the imposition of human terms (in language and 
material existence) on the animal. This creates a new condition of life (or death) 
that goes beyond what would be ‘natural’ to the animal. I do not think Lurie is 
oblivious to this imposition of terms or to the violence they imply. Yet he 
remains confused even as he confronts the sheep, now transformed to meat, on 
a plate. Here, he performs an awkward attempt to ‘pass the buck’, to Petrus. The 
latter, savvier than he is initially given credit for, refuses on the grounds that 
“[o]therwise we are passing plates all night”.275 Thereafter, Lurie tells himself “I 
am going to eat this […]. I am going to eat this and ask for forgiveness 
















   Clarkson (2009) states that the “moment of attempting to reach out beyond the 
limits of a given conceptual or representational scheme, and hence beyond what 
has been sayable in the language before, is also a linguistic breakingpoint”.277 This 
“breakingpoint” is the limit at which one may express something that has in some 
way led to one’s own ‘breaking’. It represents the point at which the individual is 
undone by the event and thus unable to coherently articulate the event. In a 
strange synchronicity, Lurie’s own breaking-point emerges at the point at which 
the dog corpses are themselves being broken. Lurie is visibly moved by his 
recollection of the event: 
One Sunday evening, driving home in Lucy’s kombi, he actually has 
to stop at the roadside to recover himself. Tears flow down his face 
that he cannot stop; his hands shake.278  
   
    In spite of this, he tells himself that he takes care of the corpses because “there 
is no one stupid enough to do it. That is what he is becoming: stupid, daft, 
wrongheaded”.279 His language is thus reduced to insults, to a hierarchy of non-
meaning (“stupid, daft, wrongheaded”). This negation has the effect of cancelling 
out a logical explanation to the events he is implicated in. Perhaps this is precisely 
the point: that there is a limit by which certain things can be rationalised, made 
logical, explained. I want to borrow from Natalie Pollard’s recent essay titled “The 
Fate of Stupidity” (2012), and think of stupidity as a “powerfully corporeal”280 
state in which “our critical faculties are confused, because ‘what has struck us’ 
evades rational and physical grasp”. 281  Even as an academic, Lourie finds it 
difficult to rationalise and articulate the killing that takes place at the animal clinic. 
I suggest that not only does he find it difficult to justify such killings when they 
are masked behind the veils of ‘euthanasia’ and ‘animal welfare’, but he is (literally) 
struck by the immensity of what he witnesses (and feels) at the clinic. Lurie is at a 
loss for words precisely because he cannot defend his implication in the killing of 
these animals, and because he is physically jolted by their bodily conditions.  
   As I have mentioned, Disgrace presents us with an array of losses. Amongst these 
are Lurie’s loss of job, the loss of his youth and sexual power that the novel 















But the narrative also allows animals the possibility of inclusion on this list. Here, 
I am thinking of “poor old Katy” who is described as “sulking”282 and we told by 
Lucy is in mourning because “no one wants her, and she knows it”.283 This, in 
spite of possibly having “offspring all over the district who would be happy to 
share their home with her”, only “it’s not in their power to invite her”.284 The 
outcomes of these losses remain unanswered. Whether the alliances that emerge 
can support a process of mourning remains unanswered, too. If anything, they can 
be read as both enabling and disrupting an acknowledgement of loss. I have 
signalled Lurie’s language as a constant impediment to the acknowledgement of 
his complicity in these losses, and to an acknowledgement of loss itself. His 
language, meticulous and thought out, paradoxically functions as a cul-de-sac to 
thought and action.  
   While Lurie’s ‘letting go’ of Driepoot has received numerous compelling 
readings,285 I read his ‘giving up’ as an attempt on his part to excommunicate the 
animal from his own surroundings. This is analogous to his explicit note of 
separation from the destitute286 and betrays his desire to demarcate not only a 
boundary between the human and the animal, but also an inter-class division from 
other humans.  
   Nevertheless, a strange inversion of roles seems to have occurred with readings 
of Disgrace. It appears that critics have ‘fallen for’ the religious undertones 
explicitly called forth by Lurie’s use of words and have read parts of the novel as 
such. In this light, Marais (2006) states that the novel ends when Lurie “selflessly 
sacrifices the lame dog that he has come to love”.287 In addition, he asserts that: 
Lurie must give up the dog because it is in the dog’s interests that 
he does so. His own needs, desires, feelings, predilections and 
predispositions are totally immaterial. To sympathise, Lurie must 
lose, indeed sacrifice or offer, himself.288 
 
   Besides the absence of an explanation as to how being killed is in Driepoot’s 
interest, I would contest that Lurie’s “needs, desires, feelings, predilections and 
predispositions” are totally material and conducive to Driepoot’s death. Moreover, 















(2003) notes that in addition to the structural similarities between Lucy’s rape and 
Melanie’s own assault, there are structural links between the killing of the dogs by 
Lucy’s rapists and Lurie’s own implication as a “dog-killer” of sorts.289       
   Yet the trend to wholly dismiss the death of animals in the novel is widespread. 
In a chapter on animal refugees in his book What Animals Mean in the Fiction of 
Modernity, Philip Armstrong is similarly doubtful of the opinion that:   
what Lurie is really giving up when he offers Driepoot for 
euthanasia is the prerogative of maintaining a privileged category of 
saved animals, whose existence is permitted only insofar as it is 
encompassed by the property rights which underlie contemporary 
capitalist societies.290  
 
   Like Armstrong, I am unconvinced of this view regarding Driepoot’s death.  
Although I agree that certain animals are “privileged” enough to be included in 
modern households (and this in some cases fact safeguards their survival), the 
sweeping scope of this statement ignores the fact that Lurie still owns all of his 
possessions at the end of the novel (including his house in Rondebosch). He is 
not only giving up a prerogative, he is terminating the life of a living being. The 
easy transposition of animals into things to think through other topics gives 
another angle to Lévi-Strauss’ famous adage that “animals are good to think 
with”.291 The materiality of their deaths, or killing, gets buried beneath the weight 
of discourse that is almost entirely separate from the act of their death or killing. 
This falls prey to Armstrong’s criticism of the use of animals as “screens for the 
projection of human interests and meanings”. 292  Descriptions that ignore the 
materiality of animal bodies in the text (but not human ones) designate the death 
of animals in Disgrace to the realm of representation. As Marais states elsewhere in 
his essay, “representation […] can only ever indicate the failure of presence”.293 So 
although animals are present everywhere in Disgrace, they can just as quickly 
disappear.  
   This disappearance means that the lives of animals in Coetzee’s novel are, to a 
great degree, denied grievability. This is related to their condition as stray, 















are further hidden behind the “closed and locked doors” of the animal shelter.294 
In this sense, the animals in Disgrace form part of the “unreal” that Butler 
discusses in her essay.295 The mourning that accompanies their loss is confined, 
like their deaths, to different forms of locked and closed doors. Lurie’s breakdown 
in the van is a literal manifestation of this situation. The metaphysical dimension 
of these locked doors is the bar introduced by the language Lurie uses, which 
attempts to rearticulate or disguise his grief as stupidity. This serves to diminish 
the sense of loss, which is almost as quickly discovered as it is discarded.    
 
***** 
   
 The Unbearable Lightness of Being, by comparison, seems to be consumed by the 
urge to recover lost people, moments, or things. In fact, one way to conceive of 
this novel is to think of it as being essentially concerned with the dynamics of loss. 
A great part of the losses that the novel explores are obligatory, or otherwise the 
result of choices made under what Giorgio Agamben has called a “state of 
exception”.296 Tomas’ and Tereza’s move to Zurich, their subsequent move back 
to Prague, Tomas’ refusal to sign a retraction for the Oedipus article he wrote, and 
their subsequent move to the country all form part of these ‘obligatory choices’ 
made under the duress of the Russian invasion.    
   The structure of Kundera’s text reflects the idea of choice and the different 
avenues that close up when a choice is made. The novel is divided into seven 
parts and is replete with variances that by their definition cancel out the other.  
These include the chapters titled “Lightness and Weight” and “Soul and Body”.297 
The extreme in each title appears to cancel out the other, or otherwise lead to an 
uneasy, often contradictory, coexistence. I have thus far explained this via the 
division of the animal from the human in the first chapter of this thesis, or in 
terms of Tereza’s uneasy relation with her body in the previous chapter.        
   We may think this further alongside Freud’s assertion that mourning is 
“regularly the reaction to the loss of a loved person or to the loss of some 
abstraction which has taken the place of one, such as one's country, liberty, an 















up to include the loss of things or ideals. We can now relate this to the 1968 
Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia that the novel explores. Are the mass marches 
that take place in different countries during this invasion perhaps an example of 
Butler’s communal mourning?   
   Before we move on to discuss this question,299 it is necessary to mention that 
alongside the marches to protest the invasion of Czechoslovakia, there is also 
mention of marches to commemorate and remonstrate against the loss of 
autonomy of other countries. Among these marches are the comically retold failed 
attempts to march in Cambodia.300 There are also increasingly “nervous and hectic” 
marches in favour or against “the American occupation of Vietnam, […] against 
the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia; yesterday for Israel, today for the 
Palestinians, yesterday for Cuba, tomorrow against Cuba…”.301    
   Sabina’s relation to these marches or crowds is one of distaste and distrust. Her 
attempts to disassociate from them depicts another side to the “we” that Butler 
supposes. If Butler’s communal mourning has to do with the acknowledgement of 
loss and the inevitable change that it brings forth, then the forced marches of the 
Communist or Soviet state are a denial of the pain that accompanies loss. They are 
marching against remembrance and against mourning. The novel depicts these 
marches as creating a “we’, but for Sabina it is a tenuous “we” founded on a 
falsified sense of unity and elation. Thus, Sabina’s reactions against the totalising 
and “idiotic” slogans commonly expressed at marches can be read as a 
continuation of attempts to dissassociate herself from group identities. 302  Her 
objection is not random. For Sabina they are associated with the obligatory 
marches of her youth. These, she associates with a false sense of joy and a “mask 
of beauty” imposed on individuals as part of the attempt to do away with 
individuality (which becomes reconfigured as dissidence). 303  For Sabina, the 
forceful creation of “the categorical agreement with being”304 that the marches 
represent are central to what is variously referred to as either Communist, Soviet 
or Totalitarian kitsch.305 This is related to “the absolute denial of shit” because it 
“excludes everything from its purview which is essentially unacceptable in human 
existence”.306 That these marches do not offer her certainty or solace is not only 















forcefully appropriated and disguised as a group in agreement. In her youth, the 
agreement was garnered on the theses of Communism. Instead of mourning the 
loss of their freedom, which for Sabina hinges on what she may or may not paint, 
those that march are made to sing and appear joyful. Marching becomes 
antithetical to the loss Sabina experiences as a result of the government decrees 
and the limits they set on thinking and on art. She is awake to what Terry 
Eagleton has called the “grotesque discrepancy between material hardship and the 
idealising claims of the state”.307    
   The material hardships of totalitarianism are made apparent everywhere in the 
novel, not least in the loss of jobs. After Tomas’ job gets taken away he becomes a 
window washer. This signifies the loss of that which “he had come to call the 
meaning of his life”.308 His loss and all it signifies forms only a part of a larger 
array of loss that the novel explores. These changes, or losses, may be included as 
further lives to mourn because of the radical change that they initiate. They can be 
read as the loss of former life and lifestyle:  
…the editor told the story of how his paper had been banned, what 
the artist who designed the poster was doing, and what had become 
of other Czech painters, philosophers and writers. After the Russian 
invasion they had been relieved of their positions and became 
window washers, parking attendants, night watchmen, boilermen in 
public buildings, or at best- and usually with pull- taxi drivers.309 
 
   These changes are compared to a cancer that destroys the social body and spirit: 
But many also died without being directly subjected to persecution; 
the hopelessness pervading the entire country penetrated the entire 
soul to the body, shattering the latter.310 
 
   There is, moreover, a material realisation to this cancer. It is the cause of 
Karenin’s illness and eventual death. His death, however, is tenderly administered 
“in the guise of his loved ones”.311 This is in contrast to the brutal killing of 















Karenin’s inclusion into the family unit, which he seems to occupy from the first 
in the role of a child:  
He took it home to Tereza, who picked it up and pressed it to her 
breast. The puppy immediately peed on her blouse.313 
    
   In this sense, Karenin’s place in Tomas and Tereza’s life safeguards him against 
what Butler has called the “violence of unrealization”.314 He is recognised as a 
member of the group formed by Tomas and Tereza. On the level of structure, his 
presence is introduced early in the novel and is present until the final pages of the 
text. Moreover, Karenin’s thoughts and ideas are presented to us in the narrative 
in the same way that the human voices are. For instance:  
Karenin was not overjoyed by the move to Switzerland. Karenin 
hated change. Dog time cannot be plotted along a straight line; it 
does not move on and on, from one thing to the next. It moves in a 
circle like the hands of a clock, which- they, too, unwilling to dash 
madly ahead- turn round and round the face, day in and day out 
following the same path. In Prague, when Tomas and Tereza 
bought a new chair or moved a flower pot, Karenin would look on 
in displeasure. It disturbed his sense of time. It was as though they 
were trying to dupe the hands of the clock by changing the numbers 
on its face. 
   Nonetheless, he soon managed to reestablish the old order and 
old rituals in the Zurich flat. As in Prague, he would jump up on 
their bed and welcome them to the day, accompany Tereza on her 
morning shopping jaunt, and make certain he got the other walks 
coming to him as well.315  
 
  Here, Karenin is described as being “the timepiece” of Tereza and Tomas’ lives. 
In this manner his significance in their daily activities is established and developed, 
but simultaneously undercut by the fact that “in periods of despair, she [Tereza] 
would remind herself that she had to hold on because of him, because he was weaker 















Even while the narrative allows Karenin a sense of independent time and 
intentionality, his negative position (as weak) is reiterated. This is done in 
comparison to Tereza, who is herself weakened by Tomas’ constant infidelities 
and is on the verge of a breakdown. 
   As I mentioned in the previous chapter, Tereza’s close relation with Karenin 
and the numerous comparisons of her to the patron saint of animals and the 
environment, Saint Francis of Assisis, 317 suggests that while Karenin is the 
timepiece of the family life, Tereza may be read as a mouthpiece to Karenin’s life. 
The discussion in the previous chapter alluded to this: Tereza’s desire to be 
considered more than a body is rooted in her feeling that what is at stake is her 
soul. Here, to be considered only a body is to be ‘animalised’ and to be open to 
violence, including the violence of an anonymous existence (depicted by Tereza in 
naked mass marches where all bodies are the same). This suggests that Tereza’s 
defence of Karenin and her close relation with him is as much rooted in a deep 
love for Karenin as it is with a need to safeguard her own ‘humanity’. 
Paradoxically, this seems to estrange her from people in general. Her discovery of 
the half buried crow, followed by the words “It was children” uttered in a way 
that reveals “unexpected repugnance for people in general” is indicative of this.318  
   We can relate Tereza’s denial of the body and again compare it to Franz’s denial. 
His attempts at controlling the body’s urges (in the pursuit of the soul) can be 
traced into the realm of death. It makes sense, then, that Franz would view 
cemeteries as “an ugly dump of stones and bones”.319 It coincides, too, that Sabina 
would be fascinated by death and by cemeteries, in which she finds beauty and 
solace. Her fear after she learns of Tomas and Tereza’s deaths is that she will be 
buried with a stone over her grave. Her choice to be cremated and her ashes 
thrown to the wind encapsulate the lightness she comes to represent in the novel. 
It is also emblematic of her desire for freedom from crowds or a fixed place: “in 
the mind of a woman for whom no place is home the thought of an end to all 
flight is unbearable”.320 
 
***** 















   Franz’s own death then brings up an interesting problem in mourning. After his 
death, his wife Marie-Claude appropriates his body and places the words “A 
RETURN AFTER LONG WANDERINGS” on his tombstone.321 As readers we 
know that this inscription is patently untrue, yet we know that many people on his 
wife’s side will believe it. As far as proof is concerned, the wife’s false words 
(made solid on stone) will outlive the quiet love and devotion of the “girl with the 
glasses”. 322  The inscription on Tomas’ grave is equally misleading: “HE 
WANTED THE KINGDOM OF GOD ON EARTH”.323 Similarly, the poet 
Frantisek Hrubin is appropriated after his death by the Minister of Culture who 
“made a speech over the grave about the poet’s love for the Soviet Union” even 
thought “the poet did everything possible to hide” from him while he was alive.324   
   These examples highlight, once more, the treacherous dimensions of language 
that the novel explores, and also the precariousness of bodies (dead human ones, 
in these cases) that have no say in how they are treated or mourned. The last 
example is significant in its unveiling of the political dimension of mourning. It 
unveils the possibility that lives can be framed in ways that dictate the way these 
lives are mourned and commemorated.   
   If the mourning of human lives can have political motivation and expression, 
what is at stake in mourning the life of an animal? This can be explained in line 
with Tereza’s experience:  
Along the way they [Tereza and Karenin] met a neighbour who was 
hurrying off to a cow shed in her rubber boots. The woman 
stopped long enough to ask, “What’s wrong with the dog? It seems 
to be limping.” “He has cancer,” said Tereza. “There’s no hope.” 
And the lump in her throat kept her from going on. The woman 
noticed Tereza’s tears and nearly lost her temper: “Good heavens! 
Don’t tell me you’re going to bawl your head off over a dog!” She 
was not being vicious; she was a kind woman and merely wanted to 
comfort Tereza. Tereza understood, and had spent enough time in 
the country to realise that if the local inhabitants loved every rabbit 
as she loved Karenin, they would be unable to kill any of them and 















woman’s words struck her as less than friendly. “I understand,” she 
answered without protest, but quickly turned her back and went her 
way. The love she bore her dog made her feel cut off, isolated… 325  
    
   The above extract depicts the threat of anti-social or anti-human behaviour that 
accompanies the mourning of an animal life. If, as I have argued, the human is 
created in contrast to the animal, then a distinction such as this makes it possible 
to assume that if one is able to mourn an animal life, it must be at the expense of 
mourning a human life. In so being, it is seen as apolitical and disengaged from 
the complexities and tragedies that accompany human life. In Precarious Life Butler 
addresses the challenge of mourning non-normative lives by noting “how certain 
forms of grief become nationally recognised and amplified, whereas other losses 
become unthinkable and ungrievable.”326 The neighbour’s response to Tereza’s 
grief betrays the neighbour’s own sense that the “hierarchy of grief” has been 
challenged. 327 Like Lurie’s words to himself, the neighbour’s “less than friendly” 
words to Tereza are meant to act as a tacit censor to Tereza’s feelings.328 Yet, the 
effect is not a cessation of pain but instead a cue that makes Tereza ‘turn her back’ 
and walk away. This isolationist gesture on Tereza’s part paradoxically confines 
her mourning to the state that Freud in his essay would deem melancholia and 
define as a “pathological condition”.329 This is in stark contrast to the possibility 
of communal mourning that Butler proposes, which is closed off to Tereza by 
virtue of the type of life she mourns. 
   The censorship that takes place denies the influence that Karenin has had on 
Tereza. It does not take into account the active role that Karenin has played in the 
life of the couple, or in the choices regarding their life. We may claim, for example, 
that Tereza and Tomas’ move to the country is as much influenced by the desire 
to avoid running into people from their past, or to diminish Tomas’ infidelities, as 
it is by the desire to live in an open space “big enough to give Karenin room for a 
decent run”. 330  Karenin’s inclusion in the unit formed by Tomas and Tereza 
allows his death to be mourned. The injection is administered to him “in the guise 















with his precious belongings in the garden.332 This is the reverse of the “unmarked, 
unmourned” death of animals in Disgrace.333   
   In spite of these important acts, Guy Scarpetta dismisses Karenin’s death as 
vaguely unimportant. He notes that it is “seemingly unrelated to the actions and 
situations of its characters” and claims that the final section of the novel 
essentially concerns “the slow death of a dog”, which for Scarpetta betrays “an 
overt desire [by Kundera] to destroy the classical notion of "novelistic 
development”. 334  Scarpetta’s dismissal of Karenin as simply “a dog” and his 
disavowal of Karenin’s importance in the life of Tereza and Tomas depicts a view 
that the death of an animal is somehow out of place in a work of serious literary 
production and that perhaps, it detracts from more serious concerns. Thus, in a 
single sentence the critic denies the emotional, familial and indeed even the 
political importance of Karenin in the novel, which I have attempted to show here. 
On another level, ignoring Scarpetta’s dismissive tone, we can see that perhaps the 
novel’s careful telling of Karenin’s illness and death does in some ways subvert 
classical notions of novelistic development where the human takes precedence 
over other forms of life. This forms part of wider concerns regarding political 




   I have used the work of various critics and have consciously inserted the animal 
into their theories, even in places where the animal was not explicitly involved. I 
have done this as an avenue of exploration into not only what constitutes a life, 
but more specifically into what constitutes a ‘grievable’ life. As much as I have 
discussed some impediments to mourning, the question of mourning animal lives 
has remained without conclusion. This relates to both Freud and Butler’s 
conception of mourning as a task and as an ongoing state. If we think of 
mourning as a transformation, “the full result of which we do not know in 
advance”,335  we do not find the conclusion that Freud first anticipated in his 
notion that “when the work of mourning is completed the ego becomes free and 















   There are alliances that can be formed (and perhaps only become possible) 
through loss. But these relations are not easy and there is a certain awkwardness 
that accompanies them. The contradictions and discontinuities of mourning a life 
that is not human raises questions about the ‘mournability’ of such lives and 
brings to the fore our own limitations in the consideration of the meaning of ‘a 
life’. These webs of relation link the enquiry of this chapter into the wider 
problems of autonomy, representation and an often taken-for-granted human 
supremacy.         
   But this is not to conflate all discourses of exclusivity. Instead, I have attempted 
to show that various points of convergence- family, society and economics- are 
not makeshift puzzle pieces that fit neatly together. They are understood 
differently in different instances. My focus on Karenin and Driepoot are only two 
of these instances. There are many others. Thus, to conflate the varying discourses 
of animal rights, sexism, racism, prisoners of war and sexuality (as many animal 
rights activists do) and to treat them as though they are all part of the same grand 
scheme erases the important individual characteristics of each, as well as the 
historical circumstances that delineate them.337 This is akin to what Judith Butler 
discusses in Bodies that Matter: 
It seems crucial to resist the model of power that would set up 
racism and homophobia and misogyny as parallel or analogical 
relations. The assertion of their abstract or structural equivalence 
not only misses the specific histories of their construction and 
elaboration, but also delays the important work of thinking through 
the ways in which these vectors of power require and deploy each 
other for the purpose of their own articulation.338   
 
   I have tried to show that these “vectors of power” differ in alternative contexts, 
cast different shadows and thus cannot be read in light of a single discourse. Still, 
the varying points of convergence are significant in the way they mark the life of 
individuals- animal or not- and the way these lives are mourned. In this way they 















country or autonomy.339 There is no norm that every life can fit, and there is no 











































   The two chapters in this thesis have in some measure focused on the body and 
its vulnerability. This is, of course, something that unites human and animal 
subjects in both novels. The body is an element that depicts the overlapping 
dualities of the human and the animal: its materiality and its processes call to mind 
the difficulty (if not the impossibility) of separating what is often portrayed as two 
disassociated poles of existence. In The Open Giorgio Agamben sees this duality as 
coinciding with “the aporias of philosophy of our time”, of “this body that is 
irreducibly drawn and divided between animality and humanity”.340 This is, as I 
have mentioned, a persistent concern in both novels. Moreover, the frailty of the 
body comes to the fore in The Unbearable Lightness of Being in the detailed 
depictions of Karenin’s illness, and in Disgrace it is highlighted via Driepoot’s 
maimed hind leg. The body is further threatened through forms of violence, 
which in both novels creates links between the supposed spheres of the human 
and the animal.  
   This is not to say that we are all the same. One way to think about the human is 
to view him or her, as Velleman suggests, as a “self-presenting creature”.341 The 
forms of presentation alternate in different contexts and is shown in the different 
ways the human characters in these novels construct their own identity. Lucy’s 
silence in Disgrace, which challenges her father’s (and perhaps also the reader’s) 
opinions is one example of this. Another example is from the excerpt in The 
Unbearable Lightness of Being where Tomas and Tereza discuss Karenin’s name. That 
a dog character could inhabit the realm of humans (and do so in a way that goes 
beyond mere anthropomorphism) and complicate not only gender but species 
borders, should alert us to the rich array of possible literary interpretation that lie 
on the horizon of what Susan McHugh has deemed “the bleeding edges of queer 
studies and animal studies”.342          
   Here, the image of blood is not incidental. Both animal studies and queer 
studies, although not the same thing, are founded on the need to overturn 















in challenging the negative connotations in the words themselves: queer and 
animal.343 These negative assumptions are themselves the seeds of various forms 
of violence. Not least among these, with regards to the animal, is the fact that we 
kill and consume their bodies daily. If we accept Derrida’s idea that the “industrial, 
scientific, technical violence” that continues to be performed on animals, “must 
change”,344 then this thesis is a change in that direction, or at least an attempt. 
Furthermore, the imperative that Derrida proclaims is in line with the problems I 
have attempted to highlight here. 
   In An Artificial Wilderness (1987), Sven Birkerts notes that in seeking lines of 
enquiry “every reader knows how serendipity works- coincidentally encountered 
allusions open hidden doors, formerly peripheral names become new centres of 
interest”.345  In my analysis of theses novels, I have opened doors of enquiry by 
borrowing from different, seemingly disconnected, critical discourses. In some 
cases, this has meant ‘inserting’ the animal into these theories in places where the 
animal was not explicitly named. I have done this for a number of reasons. 
Among these, is the recurrent thought that to challenge a (possibly) violent 
humanism, we have to open the doors of enquiry to let in those we have shut out, 
or, to borrow a phrase from Lucy in Disgrace: “to share some of our human 
privilege with the beasts”.346 This has meant putting pressure on existing lines of 
enquiry. My multi-disciplinary approach to theorising animals and our relations to 
and with them (never in the singular because not the same everywhere) suggests 
different potentials and avenues for future research in the growing field of animal 
studies. Thus, rather than ‘writing about’ animals (dogs in particular), I have 
attempted to forge out a dialogic engagement with animals that consistently points 
to our varying relations with them and to what these relations hint at about our 
own understanding of ourselves. Moreover, the wide theoretical scope of this 
thesis has attempted to challenge what Susan McHugh observes is “a more 
perniciously humanistic prejudice” among literary scholars: that “animals 
constitute bad intellectual object-choices”.347  
   The prejudice against people who dedicate time to animals is not, however, 
confined to the academy. President Jacob Zuma’s recent comments that “caring 















than humans have “a lack of humanity” depict another angle to this view.348 What 
Zuma’s comments portray (other than ignorance about the historical role of dogs 
in African societies)349 is the idea that to care for an animal is somehow at the 
expense of a human relation, that to care for one (the animal), necessarily excludes 
the other (the human). This attitude bears similarities to the one depicted by 
Tereza’s neighbour in The Unbearable Lightness of Being, which we looked at in the 
second chapter of this thesis. An interrogation of the duality between the human 
and the animal opens an abyss of questions and problems, which have ‘real-life’ 
value for those that care about (and think about) animals as more than ‘pets’. I 
have only scratched at the surface of some of these questions and, undoubtedly, 
many others remain that are yet to be discussed within this emerging field known 
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